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“In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of
phenomena, but only to track down as far as possible relations between the multifold
aspects of our experience.”
Niels Bohr
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Preface
“Howard Raiffa is one of the founders of mathematical decision theory. One day
Raiffa encounters Ernest Nagel, a distinguished philosopher of science and expert
on probability theory outside his office at Columbia University, muttering: “What
shall I do?” When Nagel asked him what the problem was, Raiffa said that he had
a job offer and couldn’t decide whether to take it. Trying to be helpful, Nagel said
to Raiffa: “Howard, you’re one of the world’s experts on decision making. Why
don’t you draw up the decision tree of all the possible actions and outcomes, use
probabilities to calculate expected utilities, and decide?”
Raiffa replied with annoyance: “Ernest, this is serious!””
Thagard (2010, p. 119, analogously)
The fascination of decision-making
The phenomenon has been subject of much debate within a variety of domains
ranging from finance, psychology, artificial intelligence to legal affairs.
It is difficult to gain all-encompassing knowledge on the state-of-the-art of research
within the respective discipline or to even get a comprehensive overview of the vast
amount of accumulated literature regarding the phenomenon and I do not attempt
myself in doing so here.
Alternatively, I will touch upon a few distinct aspects with the aim to elaborate
on essential features of decision-making in rather complex situations that demand a
combination of both, automatic and deliberate processes of thought.
Interdisciplinary aspects and scope
Within this interdisciplinary account of decision-making I argue analogously to Paul
Thagard (see for example Thagard (2000)) in favor of a cognitive naturalistic view-
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point, tying together philosophy with psychology, while capitalizing on computa-
tional ideas.
First, I give an overview of different thought-process conceptions. Next, I focus
on two fundamental distinct methodologies concerning the prediction and modeling
possibilities of decision-making outcomes and behavior (section 2).
Although the outlined approaches have their validity, I then turn to the concept
of coherence (section 3), its underlying mechanisms (section 3.3) and central role in
decision-making.
I set forth my hypothesis with reference to the applicability and extension of
coherence-based consistency maximizing principles as being key within complex
decision-making circumstances. I call attention to take into account the interaction
of conscious, and perhaps even more important, unconscious processes of thought
(section 4). Further, I highlight psychological evidence from the literature which
undermines the proposed hypothesis (section 5).
Importantly, I commit towards a critical discussion of the concept of coherence-
based inference in the light of decision-making, focusing on its explanatory power of
utilizing automatic- and unconscious moments within the process. I further high-
light existing modeling approaches that point into similar directions (section 6.2).
Finally, I focus on normative questions from a philosophical viewpoint concern-
ing process philosophy and engage in a speculative quantum theoretical-laden discus-
sion on the role of potentiality and actuality in the light of decision-making. By this
means I hope to further advance the discussion and contribute towards an enriched
understanding of the phenomenon (section 6.4).
x
xi Limitations
Limitations
In my elaborations I declare the following questions as out of scope:
• Are we free in our decisions?;
• Decision-making in the setting of moral dilemmas;
• Decision-making processes on a neurological level;
• Decision-making processes in AI expert systems;
• Bayesian probabilistic inference models;
• The nature of consciousness.
xi

Chapter 1
Models and theories
“My first empirical proposition is that there is a complete lack of evidence that, in
actual choice situations of any complexity, these [expected utility] computations can
be, or are in fact, performed...but we cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that
the unconscious is a better decision maker than the conscious.”
Simon (1955, p. 104)
1.1 Evolution of decision-making
Philosophers, mathematicians and economists were about the first who developed
theories regarding the prediction of decision-making outcomes. Especially in the
seventeenth century research in this regard became more and more popular, be-
ing grounded foremost within probabilistic theories of gambling, initiated by Blaise
Pascal and Pierre Fermat. Their initial idea was to maximize the long run average
value or expected value EV where p stands for probability and x for the objective
outcome for some number of outcomes n (Busemeyer and Johnson, 2003).
EV =
∑
(pj ∗ xj)
Equation 1.0. Formula to maximize the long run average value or expected value
EV (Busemeyer and Johnson, 2003).
These theories regarding behavior of decision-making understand humans as ex-
plicit rational beings who consciously anticipate consequences, evaluate risks and
values and eventually decide after a careful analysis of the expected utility (Glo¨ck-
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ner and Betsch, 2008).
Nowadays, however, it seems to be intuitive and to a certain extend clear that
humans’ natural decision-making abilities somewhat differ from that conception. It
is hard to imagine life by strictly applying the principles of maximizing expected
utilities, if one would always have to consider all possible alternatives and every
consequence that follows before making a decision.
Despite the controversy that the rational tenet brings with, it dictated the field
of decision research for centuries.
Herbert A. Simon, the co-founder of Artificial Intelligence and Nobel laureate,
was among the first who challenged the common established assumption of people’s
rationality in behavior. Simon doubted that humans recognize all of their possible
choices and the consequences of each selection. He claims that regarding to his
observations, the “Rational Economic Man” does not exist (Simon, 1955). Simon
argues that people do not choose the expected best option every single time they
come to a decision simply due to limitations of human cognitive abilities.
Regarding to Simon’s view, people use simple methods to do decisions based on
bounded rationality (Simon, 1982; Augier and Feigenbaum, 2003).
It follows that decision makers use simple strategies in order to reduce the amount
of information as well as the number of cognitive operations respectively to provide
shortcuts within people’s deliberations (Glo¨ckner and Betsch, 2008).
The use and nature of a model Before I proceed delineating different modeling
approaches, I will shed some light on the term itself.
A model is simpler and at the same time more abstract then the system or phe-
nomenon in reality that is being modeled. Modeling makes good sense being ap-
plied in situations where the item in question is just too complex, difficult or even
impossible to be directly dealt with; models can serve as an instrument of investiga-
tion since they allow keeping system’s essential features while omitting unnecessary
details (Fum et al., 2007).
Taken together, findings and results of model investigations support the better
understanding of what actually is being modeled.
One interesting characteristic of researching decision-making is that there are plenty
2
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of different views on the topic and people tend to focus on different aspects of the
phenomenon. It is essential to consider where and how to frame the object of inter-
est. This in turn has bold implications for the applied modeling approach and the
interpretation of results.
In the next section I will give an overview of two widely acknowledged, and at
the same time fundamental, methodologies of modeling decision-making.
1.2 Utility theories
Since behavioral sciences get more and more interested into the field of decision-
making, the phenomenon itself is becoming more behavioral, more psychological
and more descriptive as well. Nevertheless its boundaries and major theoretical
concerns are still related to the historically dominant Expected Utility family of
theories (Hastie, 2001).
The two fundamental conditions of utility based models are a.) they do not ob-
ject to describe the actual psychological process underlying a decision and b.) they
focus mostly on the selectional phase of the decision process to predict specifically
the outcome of a decision (Betsch et al., 2002).
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) advanced Daniel Bernoulli’s 1738 pro-
posed approach (see for example Polasek (2000)) to replace the expected outcome
xi by the subjective utility of this outcome U(xi) and claimed one should maximize
the Expected Utility Value EV=
∑
pj ∗ U(xj) when making a decision, because of
strong limitations of the initial Expected Value maximization idea.
Importantly, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) advanced Subjective Utility The-
ory into Prospect Theory which later was extended into Cumulative Prospect Theory
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) by introducing “rank-dependent” decision-weights.
Prospect Theory made it possible to explain for example why people are simultane-
ously attracted towards insurance and gambling. This phenomenon as an example
cannot be explained by Expected Utility Theory.
One of the fundamental differences of Prospect Theory in contrast to Utility
Theory is the replacement of the term “utility” with “value”. This has significant
3
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impact on the predicted outcome since utility functions measure just the net wealth
of a benefit, whereas “value” is bounded to the concept of gain and loss. By taking
a closer look one can identify that the value function for gains on the right hand
side is less steep and concave, whereas the loss function is steeper and convex in
comparison.
U = w(p1) ∗ v(x1) + w(p2) ∗ v(x2) + . . .
Equation 1.1. Prospect Theory function where x1, x2 are the potential outcomes
and p1, p2 the corresponding probabilities, v is the s-shaped value function and w
corresponds to the probability weighting function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
This implicates that for people it is not the same in terms of relative scale to win
100$ or to loose 100$. Loosing 100$ is felt much more in comparison than winning
100$.
Next, it is important to notice that gains and losses are relative to some func-
tions’ reference point that may vary from situation to situation.
Another major difference to the Expected Utility approach is that Prospect The-
ory handles probabilities not in probabilities but in “decision-weights”. It assumes
that these weights do not always correspond to probabilities. Specifically, Prospect
Theory postulates that decision weights tend to overweight small probabilities and
underweight moderate and high probabilities (Plous, 1993).
Limitations Even though Utility Theories have developed remarkably from the
first ideas of rationality towards the much improved (cumulative) Prospect Theory,
there are still strong limitations regarding their usage and power to predict or ex-
plain the behavior of human decision-making.
In the following I point out some major issues and paradoxes regarding human
decision-making capabilities which remain challenging for utility models.
Hastie (2001) describes two major issues coming along concerning the Expected
Utility framework, namely incompleteness as well as lack of valid description of
decision-making processes.
4
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Further, the author argues that many aspects of the decision process lie outside
of this analysis. No statements are made about how the decision situation is com-
prehended or what sources feed into the process. Hastie (2001) delineates that the
utility framework focuses mainly on the outcome of a decision and therefore lacks
to describe the detailed underlying mechanisms responsible for the decision.
Next, the vital aspect of context-dependent preferences is being discussed. This
class of human choice paradox set forth that decisions are not only depended on
changes in the task, but also in changes in the context produced by the choice set
for a single task (Busemeyer and Johnson, 2003). At the same time these preference
reversals involve violations of a principle called independence from irrelevant alter-
natives (Busemeyer and Johnson, 2003).
Essentially, the principle is used widely by many different utility approaches.
Generally speaking, it assumes that if an option A is chosen more frequently over a
second option B, then the first option would also be chosen more often over option
B in a larger choice set, like for example if there is an additional option C.
However there is compelling evidence that this is in fact not the case. Busemeyer
and Johnson (2003) outlines three well known paradoxes that violate the principle
of independence. Those include the:
• similarity effect,
• attraction effect,
• compromise effect.
In the following part the three paradoxes are explained and illustrated.
Similarity effect The similarity effect as shown in Figure 1.2 on page 6 is
the first paradox initially described by Tversky (1972). It describes how two simi-
lar options hurt each other in terms of the probability being chosen compared to a
different option B. This happens even if the probability of the choice between A or
B (without S) is equal and between S and B (without A) is equal as well.
In this example buying one car out of three options (depending on different
parameters) is being considered (Busemeyer et al., 2007, analogously).
Let’s assume there is only car A and car B which are pretty different regarding the
5
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parameters “economy” and “quality”. The probability of being chosen is equal. By
adding an additional option (car S ) that is similar to car A, the probability of buying
car A decreases in contrast to car B because the similar option S hurts option A.
Figure 1.1: The similarity effect (Tversky, 1972).
Attraction effect The attraction effect as shown in Figure 1.2 on page 7 vi-
olates the rational principle of regularity. That is, in a choice set of A and B the
additional option C would either leave the probability of A and B untouched (in
the case C is never chosen) or it would decrease the probability of A and B in a
similar way (C is sometimes chosen).
However the attraction effect shows that the opposite is the case. Ariely (2008)
delineates the effect comprehensively by an example where two choice sets are avail-
able with three faces containing either a slightly uglier version of Jerry (Jerry’) or
a slightly uglier version of Tom (Tom’). In his experiment people were asked to
choose whom they would like to date. The question was: would the similar, but
slightly uglier “brothers” that are also dominated by Tom or Jerry would help them
being dated? The results say absolute yes. If ugly Jerry’ was present Jerry was
more popular, if ugly Tom’ was available, Tom was more popular. This irrational
behavior of human decision-making has distinct impacts on live in general, like for
6
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example if you ask yourself whom to take with you if you are going bar crawling
(Ariely, 2008).
Figure 1.2: The attraction effect illustrated by this “similar faces” example (Ariely,
2008).
Compromise effect This effect as shown in Figure 1.3 on page 8 is another
violation of the principle of independence from irrelevant alternatives. The effect
occurs if there are two equal likely options B and C, and a more extreme option A is
added making C the middle option. In that case it reveals that option C becomes
more popular and likely being chosen in contrast to option B.
Heuristic rule-based systems A prominent family of Utility Theory which is
subject to much ongoing debate, as we will further discuss in section 6.1, are heuris-
tics.
These rule-based systems ground within the above delineated picture of Herbert
Simon and his proposed approach to “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1982). Accord-
7
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Figure 1.3: The compromise effect as outlined by (Busemeyer et al., 2007).
ingly, people use simple strategies or heuristics that reduce the amount of infor-
mation given and the number of cognitive operations when they choose or decide.
Heuristics therefore can be seen as mental shortcuts towards decisions.
It is assumed that people use heuristic rules as strategies depending on the given
situation. Thus, it is assumed that one would use a cognitive less intensive strategy
finding a decision in any situation involving for example extreme time pressure or
when addressing trivial problems. On the other hand in important situations the
decision-maker would use a mentally more demanding heuristic to achieve better
performance and more accurate “thought-through” results.
Taken together, heuristic rule-based approaches apply decision selection as a
trade-off between mental effort required to apply the strategy and the overall accu-
racy of the selected strategy (Busemeyer and Johnson, 2008).
Well known examples of heuristics are the lexicographic rule, LEX (Fishburn,
1974) which is concerned only about the most important feature, the equal-weight
strategy, EQW (Payne et al., 1988) which essentially evaluates and weights different
alternatives but neglects differences in probability or significance, and the “take the
best” strategy (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer et al., 1999) where rules
can be defined for information search, search stopping and option selection.
8
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The advantage of heuristic rule-based strategies are that they are capable of ex-
plaining different effects when making decisions under time pressure or with less/
more effort.
It seems that these sensible estimation procedures are “irrational” since heuristics
appear to be “quick and dirt” solutions, but may draw on highly sophisticated under-
lying processes like memory retrieval or feature matching; consequentially heuristic
processes are not extraordinary responses to problems of huge complexity or an over-
load of information, but normal intuitive responses to even the simplest questions
about likelihood and prediction (Gilovich et al., 2002).
On the other hand, however, heuristics lack to account for choice paradoxes like
for example the previously described compromise or attraction effect. Further it is
by no means always clear which strategy the decision-maker has been using in a
given situation.
1.3 Computational models
Utility models were undoubtedly successful in aforementioned specific domains to
predict decision outcomes. Yet the utility framework remains challenging. It faces
ongoing criticism mainly from behavioral sciences where there is increasing evi-
dence about the existence of a variety of factors that are inevitable for the human
decision-making process. These are for example emotional evaluation, unconscious
processing or the relevance of people’s underlying goals or beliefs within (see for ex-
ample Damasio (1994); Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006); Thagard (2000)). Those
criteria have been widely ignored or left out within utility theoretical considerations.
Therefore computational models follow a different modeling approach, namely to
focus on decision-making behavior rather than just on the outcome of the decision.
In this sense computational models to some extend “behave” themselves which can
be described and measured.
The connectionist approach In contrast to the aforementioned utility frame-
work, connectionism aims to describe behavioral phenomena as an emergent pro-
cesses that results from an interconnected network (see for example McClelland and
9
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Rumelhart (1986); Hopfield (1982); Read et al. (1997).
Behavioral phenomena may also be referred to as mental phenomena. One of
the central principles of connectionism is that mental phenomena may in fact be
described by a network model which consists of neuron-like, simple units. Those
units can vary greatly in their amount but are richly interconnected and capable to
send signals to connected neighbors determined by their current level of activation.
There are different kinds of connectionist models. The most well known are
perhaps distributed connectionist models of mental representations which are also
known as parallel distributed processing, or artificial neural network models (Mc-
Clelland and Rumelhart, 1986). It is important to note that none of the single
units represent a meaningful concept by itself. Rather it is the overall interplay of
the network with its activated units where activation pattern emerge. In this way
meaningful concepts can be represented.
Accordingly, Thomas and McLelland (2008) identify within The Cambridge Hand-
book of Computational Psychology four connectionist key aspects, namely:
• that processing is simultaneously influenced by multiple sources of information
at different levels of abstraction, operating vi-soft constraint satisfaction;
• that representations are spread across multiple simple processing units oper-
ating in parallel;
• that representations are graded, context sensitive, and the emergent product
of adaptive processes;
• that computations similarity-based and driven by the statistical structure of
problem domains, but it can nevertheless produce rule-following behavior.
Ule (2012) gives a compelling and depictive account of the theoretical applica-
bility of a connectionist approach to model mental phenomena. From the author’s
explanations it follows how artificial neuronal networks approach to some extend
cognitive processing within a “conscious brain”:
“We can thus conceive of the human mental structure as a dynamic
system which is incredibly sensitive to different aspects of events in the
world. We can comprehend this sensitivity as the permanent restoration
10
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of structural similarity between the informative aspects of change that a
conscious being is aware of and its mental states.
In order to do that, the “conscious brain” must be enormously flexible to
acquire similarities and differences between its own processes, processes
in its body and outer processes which it is sensitive to. Some models of
parallel distributed processing and neural network models (connectionist
models) of the brain can help us with modeling that kind of flexibility.
Connectionist models of cognitive processing incorporate a constant com-
parison of the behavior of outer objects (“targets”) and the activity of
an individual cognitive agent.
These models contain different layers of “hidden” computation units or
aggregates of units (e.g. neurons and groups of neurons) that are not
directly connected to the environment and whose purpose is, in effect,
to detect statistical patterns in the activity of the “visible” units (e.g.
sensory inputs which “depict” the behavior of outer objects)” (Ule, 2012,
p. 31).
The above considerations clearly outline the psychological plausibility of neu-
ronal network models due to their close ties with the neuroscientific conception of
the brain. At the same time the difference in methodology compared to a utility
framework becomes evident.
Decision Field Theory Busemeyer and Johnson (2003) describes the decision
process in the human brain as a mechanism of stimuli input accumulation towards
a specific threshold. In this sense, the option which exceeds this threshold first is
been chosen.
This idea is formalized in Decision Field Theory by Busemeyer and Johnson
(2003) and represents one concrete example of a neuronal network model towards
approaching human decision-making behavior inspired by neuroscientific findings.
Thus, Decision Field Theory is a connectionist model of decision-making that be-
haves in regard to the stimulus accumulation principle. The underlying idea is shown
in Figure 1.3 on page 12.
The illustration depicts the evaluation of three options that are considered. The
threshold bound is shown in the upper graphic area whereas the options A, B and
C are shown in the main part. Each option differs in its preference state at any
11
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Figure 1.4: The connectionist Decision Field Theory model (Busemeyer and John-
son, 2003).
given time of deliberation through cognitive demanding option evaluation. As soon
as one option exceeds the threshold bound, it is being chosen from the decision-
maker. The high of threshold can vary regarding to the situation or the personality
of the decision-maker. Is the latter for example characterized by impulsiveness,
the threshold bound would be lower compared to the careful deliberation favoring
decision-maker. The schematic structure of the neuronal network represents Decision
Field Theory whereas the underlying formulas are given in Figure 1.3 on page 12.
In principle a first momentary attention-weighted evaluation of each of the op-
tions’ payoff is evaluated at the first layer of nodes. By means of this the affective
evaluation of each payoff is given by
Ui(t) =
∑
Wij(t) ∗mj
Equation 1.2. Decision Field Theory where Wij(t) is the attention weight at time t
for a payoff j offered by prospect i (Busemeyer and Johnson, 2003).
This process fluctuates over time. The second layer’s responsibility is to evaluate
and compare the different options’ prospects and pay-offs regarding to their valence
V(t) over time.
In the third layer, the valences are used as an input to a dynamical system that
12
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generates the preference state P(t) for a distinct option over time. Furthermore
the principle of lateral inhibition within the network known from human physiologic
structures (e.g. vision) serves as methodological tool of an important mechanism in
describing context effects on preference (Busemeyer and Johnson, 2003).
Taken together, this described connectionist approach representing Decision Field
Theory provides explanatory power of the human decision-making phenomenon that
cannot be achieved by either algebraic utility models or simple heuristic models.
For instance, Decision Field Theory can account for all three context depended pref-
erences (similarity-, compromise-, and attraction effect). Further it can explain the
influence of time pressure regarding those effects.
Interestingly, these accumulation-to-threshold theories seem to be potent enough
to play an important role in the rising field of neuroeconomics.
Recent studies are able to explain the phenomenon that people buy more in shops
with less variety of choice than in shops with extensive product variety. This might
be due to the demand of less mental effort when choosing one specific kind of product
(Schwartz, 2005).
13

Chapter 2
Processes of thought within
decision-making
“One might almost believe that half of our thinking takes place unconsciously . . . .
I have familiarized myself with the factual data of a theoretical and practical problem;
I do not think about it again, yet often a few days later the answer to the problem will
come into my mind entirely from its own accord; the operation which has produced
it, however, remains as much a mystery to me as that of an adding-machine: what
has occurred is, again, unconscious rumination.”
Schopenhauer (1973, p. 123-124)
2.1 Types of cognitive operations
Since decades researchers investigate human thinking and their underlying processes.
A comprehensive unifying theory of human thought acknowledged by the scientific
community seems not to be in reach yet for some time to come.
However there is wide agreement on the existence of two different systems of rea-
soning (see for example Sloman (1996) for an overview). This issue is still subject
of ongoing debate in cognitive psychology and rises the following questions: Can
human thinking be understood as parallel information processing along vague lines
of associative connections? Or is it more the case that the nature of our thinking is
based on serial and deliberate symbolic manipulation on mental representations?
15
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2.1.1 Deliberate processes
The conception of the human as “Homo Oeconomicus” is the understanding that
people act as rational decision-makers that constantly anticipate all possible al-
ternatives to a decision problem, evaluate and weight their options accordingly –
eventually deciding after a thorough analysis of the expected utility of each outcome
option (see for example Van Der Rijt (2006)).
Needless to say this modus of decision-making includes the consumption of much
resources as for example cognitive load and time. As mentioned above, Herbert Si-
mon was among the first who doubted those rational models of choice behavior (see
for example (Simon, 1955, 1982) for an overview). Based on his work, researchers
identified many of specific heuristic strategies which people seem to use in order
to reduce the demand of cognitive resources, operations and information necessary
when deciding (see for example Beach and Mitchell (1978); Payne (1982); Gigerenzer
et al. (1999); Payne et al. (1988); Gigerenzer (2004)).
Importantly, most of the decision-strategies brought forward by researchers in
the field were concerned about deliberate processes of thought and information pro-
cessing within the phenomenon and widely neglected the potential of automatic
processes (see for example Frederick (2002)).
However it should be noted that Herbert Simon already speculated about the
importantness of the automatic system nearly 60 years ago:
“My first empirical proposition is that there is a complete lack of
evidence that, in actual choice situations of any complexity, these rational
computations can be, or are in fact, performed [...] but we cannot, of
course, rule out the possibility that the un-conscious is a better decision
maker than the conscious” (Simon, 1955, p. 104).
2.1.2 Automatic processes
It turned out that it would take the field of decision-making research another couple
of decades in order to pay attention towards the unconscious, automatic compo-
nent within the attempt to account for behavioral choice (see for example Damasio
(1994); Finucane et al. (2000); Lieberman (2000); Hogarth (2001); Haidt (2001);
Dougherty et al. (1999)).
16
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It has been shown that the automatic system performs operations of quick and
simultaneous information integration of various bits of information when people de-
cide for example on the basis of recognition of a certain situation or by identifying
rules of learned behavior (Klein, 1999).
Finucane et al. (2000) highlights that memory processes which are involved
within affect-based decision-making are widely governed by the automatic system
via feedback learning loops. Essentially, it is also assumed that the automatic sys-
tem may not only guide operations of recognition, affect generation and activation of
behavioral knowledge from memory, but may also direct subsequent processes that
pertain to information integration and choice (Glo¨ckner and Betsch, 2008).
As I will discuss in section 3.2 and section 6.2, it is crucial to highlight that so-
called consistency maximizing models assume the governing of the automatic system
and processes of information integration and choice.
2.1.3 Dual-process theories
The question if we are living with two minds in one brain where one mind acts in
accordance with the slow but holistically operating automatic system and another
mind, governed by structured and deliberate thinking, has sparked much debate
among researchers. The topic raised voices against (see for example Keren and
Schul (2009)) or in favor (see for example Evans (2003)) of such a conception (see
for example additionally Osman (2004) for an overview).
The existence of a “double-mind” are the assumption of dual-process theories
which have been summarized within a two-systems framework (see for example Kah-
neman and Frederick (2002)). Within it has been assumed that the two systems,
labeled as System 1 and System 2 by Stanovich and West (2000) serve different
purposes.
System 1 is described as the evolutionary old part that comprises of a set of
autonomous subsystems including both, innate input modules and domain-specific
knowledge acquired by a domain-general learning mechanism; System 2 in compar-
ison is evolutionarily recent and distinctively human. It permits abstract reasoning
and hypothetical thinking capabilities, constrained by working memory capacity and
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correlated with measures of general intelligence (Evans, 2003).
Evans (2003) elaborates further on the interplay of System 1 and System 2:
“The stream of consciousness that broadly corresponds to System 2
thinking is massively supplemented by a whole set of autonomous sub-
systems in System 1 that post only their final products into conscious-
ness and compete directly for control of our inferences, decisions and
actions. However, System 2 provides the basis for hypothetical thinking
that endows modern humans with unique potential for a higher level of
rationality in their reasoning and decision-making.”
It follows that System 1 and System 2 are connected by two different cognitive
systems with different distinctive process characteristics.
The characterization of those different processes is tricky business and far from
simple. Kahneman and Frederick (2002) delineate the following overview (Table 2.1
on page 18) on which there has been reached considerable agreement (but see for
example Marewski et al. (2009) for a critical elaboration on the practice of those
categorizations).
System 1 (Intuitive) System 2 (Reflective)
Process characteristics
Automatic Controlled
Effortless Effortful
Associative Deductive
Rapid, parallel Slow, serial
Process opaque Self-aware
Skilled action Rule application
Content on which processes act
Affective Neutral
Causal propensities Statistics
Concrete, specific Abstract
Prototypes Sets
Table 2.1: Two cognitive systems. Analogously to Kahneman and Frederick (2002).
For an additional comprehensive discussion on the interplay of the two systems
see for example Plessner et al. (2007) or Glo¨ckner and Witteman (2010). The arising
key question becomes obvious: if there are really “two minds within one brain”, how
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do this minds interact? And further, how can these interaction processes and their
underlying mechanisms be adequately described and modeled?
This remains a challenging task indeed. In consequence one of the goals within
this work is to capitalize on ways forward.
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Chapter 3
The concept of coherence
“The coherentist approach, working within the theory of coherence as constraint
satisfaction, is psychologically realistic and computationally feasible, yet it can con-
tribute to the traditional goal of philosophy to be prescriptive as well as descriptive
of human thought and action. Philosophy and cognitive science can thrive together
in the twenty-first century.”
Thagard (2000, p. 286)
3.1 Introduction into the subject
The following chapter describes the concept of coherence. Within, I outline the the-
ory and mechanisms on which coherence is based upon within the light of decision-
making research.
Over the past decades connectionist theories of cognition, and in particular con-
straint satisfaction mechanisms reformulated established consistency theories. Con-
nectionist constraint-satisfaction models were first applied to lower-level cognitive
processes and further advanced to be applied towards a variety of higher-level cog-
nitive processes, including analogical mapping (Spellman et al., 1993), evaluation of
competing explanations (Thagard, 1989, 1992) and decision-making (Thagard and
Millgram, 1995; Thagard and Kroon, 2006).
Thagard and Millgram (1995) propose a coherence theory of decision. The the-
ory conveys that people not only decide between specific decision options but base
their decisions on a holistic set of complex concurring goals and actions in parallel.
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Thagard (2000) proposes a general theory of coherence as the satisfaction of mul-
tiple interacting constraints and shows that the theory has numerous psychological
and philosophical applications since much of human cognition can be understood in
terms of coherent constraint satisfaction principles.
Within, Thagard discusses how people make sense of each other and the world they
live in on the basis of fitting something puzzling into a coherent pattern of mental
representations including propositions like concepts, beliefs, goals and actions.
Thagard’s cognitive naturalistic viewpoint on coherence draws on the central
hypothesis of cognitive science that thought can be understood in terms of compu-
tational procedures on mental representations. This approach strives towards an
understanding of the mind in terms of rules, concepts, analogies, images and neural
networks.
Coherence theory is about how different pieces fit together in order to form a
whole. It assumes that there are various kinds of associations between the pieces
or the elements of a set. Those are primarily positive or negative, where a positive
association suggests that the two elements support each other while a negative as-
sociation indicates their mutual exclusion.
Thagard views the associations as constraints between elements and proposes a the-
ory of coherence as globally maximizing the satisfaction of those constraints. Gen-
erally speaking, Thagard sets forth to partition the set of elements into accepted or
rejected ones so that overall coherence is achieved, or constraint satisfaction maxi-
mized (for a detailed description see section 3.3).
3.2 Cognitive consistency theories
The prominence of consistency theory and interrelated constraint satisfaction princi-
ples that undergo the concept of coherence as a paradigm to describe much of human
behavior in a psychological plausible way – including decision-making – appears ap-
pealing but does not come by chance. As I will show in the following, connectionist
modeling principles share striking similarities with cognitive consistency theories
and “Gestalt” principles which mark a cornerstone in modern social psychology (for
a comprehensive overview see for example Read et al. (1997) and Read et al. (2003)).
Cognitive consistency theories aim to shape the base for a theory of cognition
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in that Lewin (1935) for instance strives to develop a “psychology of knowing”
(Rosenberg and Abelson, 1960). Within a framework can be found that would
explain how “[...] one idea leads to another psychologically” (McGuire, 1960, p.
140).
3.2.1 Gestalt principles
In one of the initial pieces of work in the area of cognitive balance theory, Heider
(1946) speculated that mutual interdependence amongst elements of thought forms
states of order and coherence which undergo principles of structural dynamics:
“These conceptions, symmetry, consonance, balance, and simplicity,
are, of course, implied in that idea with which Gestalt theory started and
which always was central to it, namely, the idea of a “good” figure [...]
This model implies a number of different entities with certain properties
and standing in certain relations, which make up a constellation of factors
tending toward a standard state (Heider, 1960, p. 168).”
Coherence has been proposed to be a state within a dynamic system in which
tension is at a minimum and different notions like consistence, balance, equilibrium
or harmony have been suggested (Simon and Holyoak, 2002). Gestaltian figures
illustrate that psychological processes act in distinct ways in that they increase the
state of coherence within the system due to decreasing inconsistent factors.
Gestaltian figures A very prominent “good” figure within Gestalt psychology is
the “Kanizsa Triangle” (Figure 3.1 on page 24) in which an illusionary white triangle
appears to be on top of a black triangle and three black circles:
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Figure 3.1: The Kanizsa Triangle illusion by Kanizsa (1955).
The illusion is often used to point out the principle that objects which are
grouped together in a certain way are seen as a consistent whole. Thus, gaps within
the figure are suppressed and illusionary contours are constructed by our brains.
Similar, the following Rabbit-duck illusion Figure 3.2 on page 24 is often used
as a metaphor for consistency maximizing principles:
Figure 3.2: The rabbit-duck illusion by Kuhn (1970, p. 126).
It demonstrates how our brain organizes information in a way that makes sense
to us. In this attempt the visual stimuli are, again, perceived as a meaningful whole.
Thus, the image switches forth and back from being a rabbit into being a duck while
it is not possible to see the rabbit and the duck at the same time.
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Relevance of consistency theories Leading researchers in the field acknowledge
the consistency maximizing principle as a mechanism for actively making sense of a
diverse world. Its significance has been repeatedly highlighted by consistency theory
advocates as delineated below:
Heider (1979, p. 16) assumes that states of stability and balance undergo the
aspiration
“to have our cognitive food prepared so that it is easy to swallow, to
assimilate”.
Abelson (1968, p. 133) anticipates that cognitive function is in need to
“organize [italics added] the information stored by the individual in a
way that is likely to be useful to him, directly or indirectly, for affective
or behavioral purposes”.
Pepitone (1966, p. 270) emphasizes the significance of consistent structures in
that they
“are simpler to maintain than distinctions, discrepancies and contra-
dictions”.
Tannenbaum (1968, p. 346) elaborates on this standpoint further:
“The reasoning behind [the consistency position] relates to the organ-
ism’s presumed need to apprehend and comprehend things and events
about him. In monitoring, processing, and interpreting information from
the environment, some degree of consistency and equilibrium is seen as
essential for reasons of parsimony and economy of effort, as well as to
allow for the predictability of, and hence adaptability to, subsequent
encounters [...] most assume a universal value for the organism in his
having a stable predictable view of his environment”.
The influence of structural dynamics on cognitive consistency theories
Simon et al. (2004b) summarizes four concepts of cognitive consistency theories that
were inspired by the principles of structural dynamics as outlined in the following:
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Holistic rather than elemental determination of cognitive states The
first principle assumes that cognitive states are not only determined by their own
properties but through their formed interaction structures. This claim becomes
explicitly evident within the above outlined Gestalt figures and their holistic visual
perceivable structures. Heider (1960, p. 168) clarifies:
“The properties of these configurations which determine their mean-
ing and their fate are whole-qualities. Consonance or simplicity of the
structure cannot be derived in an additive way from the properties of
the parts”.
Likewise, Festinger (1957, p. 279) makes clear that a state of dissonance
“is not anything which exists all by itself. It is a characterization of
a relationship between cognitive elements”.
Dynamic properties of structure As Zajonc (1983) explains, the interre-
latedness between elements within structures generate forces that determine the
configuration of the structure. This is especially interesting as those forces also de-
limit the stability of the structure and allows it the possibility to change, as we have
seen in Figure 3.2 on page 24.
Mental processes settle at specific structural properties Distinct struc-
tural properties tend to let mental processes settle. Within, they transfer into a
stable state where:
“[...] all parts of a unit have the same dynamic character (i.e., all
are positive, or all are negative), and entities with different dynamic
character are segregated from each other” (Heider, 1946, p. 107).
Reconstructions of cognitive elements This principle brings forward the
intriguing claim that cognitive elements are being “reconstructed” by dynamic changes
that occur on the structural level (Rosenberg and Abelson, 1960). Further Wertheimer
(1924, p. 2) clarifies that
“the part-processes [of Gestaltian principles] are themselves deter-
mined by the intrinsic nature of the whole”.
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Festinger (1957) illustrates a central issue within structural dynamics which remains
key for consistency theory and ultimately the comprehension of human cognition in
that consonance is restored by changing the elements that are in dissonant relations,
adding consonant ones, or decreasing the importance of the dissonant elements.
I will further discuss those implications and evidence of reconstruction principles
within coherence-based reasoning in more detail in section 5.1.
Challenges and prospects of consistency theories Even though consistency
theories experience much support from the Gestaltian discourse deeply rooted within
psychology, research after 1960 on most topics within the field came to a practical
halt.
Main reasons therefore were that the theories were not able to live up to their
highly ambitious goals of formulating a new psychology of inference explaining com-
plex phenomena which admittedly feels to be a conflicting manifold endeavor.
The proposed consistency theories suffered severely from limiting drawbacks.
The theories were adversely designed to explain relatively limited and small struc-
tures. Cognitive dissonance theory for example constraints the amount of involved
elements to only two (Festinger, 1957, p. 13). Furthermore the strength of units
and relations between structures were restricted to unitary levels (see for example
Heider (1946)).
The lack of explanatory power for evaluating and computing consistency made
an advancement towards research in comprehensive modeling of cognitive phenom-
ena impossible (Read et al., 1997; Read and Miller, 1994).
It is only until recently that new methods and potent techniques emerged to conceiv-
ably overcome some of the obstacles eventually by the appearance of connectionist
theories of cognition and parallel constraint satisfaction mechanisms (see section 3.3
for more details).
3.3 The concept of parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS)
The intuition behind this approach according to Thagard (1989); Thagard and Mill-
gram (1995); Thagard (2000) is that the interaction of mental representations can
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be modeled as entities within a neuronal network where there are various degrees of
coherent and incoherent relations between the established nodes. If there is a strong
negative association between two nodes, coherence may be increased by deciding to
accept one of the nodes while rejecting the other.
If there is a strong positive association, coherence will be increased when either
both nodes are accepted or both are rejected.
Thus, we can construct a partition of the set of nodes with one set of nodes in the
partition being accepted and the other rejected in a way to maximize the coherence
of the entire set. Such accepted sets are for example denoted by A and the rejected
sets by R. The “coherence value” is calculated by considering positive associations
within nodes of A and within nodes of R, and negative associations between nodes
of A and R.
3.3.1 Structure and principles of PCS
Parallel constraint satisfaction models contain structures of nodes and intercon-
nected links between as outlined schematically above within a connectionist mod-
eling approach section 3. The nodes within stand for various kinds of mental rep-
resentations as for example concepts, beliefs, hypothesis or actions whereas links
describe relationships between representations (see also Read et al. (1997) for an
introduction).
Importantly, those links can be excitatory or inhibitory in nature. Nodes either
support or inhibit each other regarding the structure of the network and the con-
stellations as well as meaning between representations.
Activation of a node within the network is determined by values which vary within
the parallel constraint satisfaction network. They are represented by the accept-
ability of the hypothesis or the degree of trust within a represented concept in the
network.
The process of consistency maximizing can be described as spreading of activa-
tion within the network. Thus, activation enters into the system through a specific
source node and propagates further to connected nodes through the network struc-
ture. Nodes that are connected through excitatory links will be activated whereas
nodes connected through inhibitory links are going to be inhibited due to the prop-
agation of negative activation.
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Figure 3.3: This is the general network structure of a PCS model by Glo¨ckner and
Betsch (2008, p. 7)
.
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It is vital to mention here that all links within parallel constraint satisfaction
models are bidirectional. Therefore activation spreads from node A to node B (and
all other interconnected nodes to A as well) and vice versa. The network nodes in-
fluence each other mutually through the same links whereas the activation of nodes
changes as the iterative updating cycles progress.
The updating algorithm of the network is active till the network reaches a status of
stability. The nodes of the network after a certain amount of cycles do not change
anymore, the system reached through self-organization mechanisms a coherent state
in which the node containing the highest activation represents the “solution” to the
decision problem.
This solution is the most consistent option within the scenario given the considered
mental representations and their mutual relationship structure. The network “be-
haved” in a sense that maximal satisfaction within the network is obtained while
considering the system’s constraints in a parallel fashion.
Read et al. (1997) set forth that the system’s found solution equals to a local mini-
mum within the system’s energy and hence represents a state of maximal consistency.
To summarize, the principles of constraint satisfaction assume that the percep-
tion of a decision-making situation triggers PCS mechanisms among mental repre-
sentations.
Those representations consist of options and cues that relate to each other given the
decision scenario’s circumstances. If for example an individual decides between two
options, then relevant cues will be incorporated into mental representations (nodes
within the network) which in turn are being activated regarding to the decision cir-
cumstances.
The activation of the network results in a certain degree of inconsistency and tension
within the system. Consequently this is the result of inconsistency in the network
due to interrelated constraints between specific representations that fit or do not fit
together given the decision situation.
3.3.2 Mathematical description of PCS mechanisms
The positive or negative activation of nodes within the network follows a mathemat-
ical function that determines the spreading of activation in the system.
30
31 3.3. The concept of parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS)
The following sigmoid activation function Figure 3.4 on page 31, has been suggested
frequently:
Figure 3.4: Graph of the general form of a nonlinear, sigmoid-shaped function.
Originally proposed by McClelland and Rumelhart (1986), adopted from Read et al.
(1997, p. 29).
ai(t + 1) = ai(t)(1− decay) +
if inputi(t) < 0 inputi(t)(ai(t)− floor)if inputi(t) ≥ 0 inputi(t)(ceiling − ai(t))
Equation 3.0. Non-linear model node activation function. Originally proposed by
McClelland and Rumelhart (1986), adopted from Glo¨ckner and Betsch (2008, p. 6).
The activation of a node i at time t+1 results from the product of activation
of the same node at the previous time step t and an inhibitory parameter 1-decay.
Additionally input activation from all other interlinked nodes is summed-up and
multiplied with a scaling factor. This guarantees the sigmoid shape of the function
Figure 3.4 on page 31 as activation intensity shrinks the closer the node’s activity
is located at the floor or ceiling parameter.
The incoming activation of a system’s node input i(t) is calculated by the sum of
the product of the activation of all the node’s interlinked nodes j multiplied by the
strength wij of the connection between the two nodes i and j.
inputi(t) =
∑
j=1→n
wijaj(t)
Equation 3.1. Description of the incoming activation of a connectionist system’s
node input initially proposed by McClelland and Rumelhart (1986). Adopted from
Glo¨ckner and Betsch (2008, p. 6).
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According to this procedure for every point in time from t=1 to n the activation
of a node within the system is calculated on its previous degree of activation as well
as on its incoming activation. After a certain amount of updating iterations the
system finds a solution as it settles at a status of minimal energy or inconsistency.
Read et al. (1997, p. 30) explains that if the product of the activation of two
nodes is consistent with the constraint between them, energy decreases; whereas, if
the activation of two nodes is inconsistent with the constraint between them, energy
increases. Thus, the authors continue, “[...] this energy function essentially measures
the extent to which the pattern of activations of the nodes is inconsistent with the
relations between them”.
Energy(t) = −
∑
i
∑
j
wijaiaj
Equation 3.2. Description for the system’s state of energy after settlement
proposed by Hopfield (1982).
3.3.3 Description of (automatic) consistency maximizing principles
The above outlined PCS mechanisms within decision-making are importantly based
on automatic processes and intuitive moments within the phenomenon. The key
principle is the holistic way of taken into account information consideration and the
mutual influence of representations.
The decision-making phenomenon as described here can be understood as the con-
struction of a representation of the decision-making scenario due to information
modification in a specific way that makes maximum sense to the decision-maker.
The network has reached a state of maximum coherence between conflicting infor-
mation through modification of elements (see also section 5.1).
The advantage of this process is for the decision-maker to arrive at quick decisions
that are embedded within complex circumstances and information constellations.
To build upon previously outlined PCS principles and to summarize the framework,
the following section delineates according to Glo¨ckner and Betsch (2008, p. 222) the
three stages of activation, consistency maximization and decision where automatic
moments are key:
Activation PCS processes start with the activation of the parallel constraint sat-
isfaction network when facing a decision. The perception of the decision situation
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activates the integration of relevant options, cues and cue information into a tempo-
ral mental representation. Both, new as well as already stored information through
experience can feed into this process. Relevant mental representations form a PCS
network which has been schematically outlined above (see section 3.3.1).
Maximizing consistency In a next step representations of relevant information
is being evaluated by automatic processes in a holistic way and combined to form
a maximal coherent picture of the information constellation. In this process con-
cepts including consistent information are being strengthened whereas inconsistency
among representations will result in loss of their influence. Consistency maximizing
mechanisms in decision scenarios may be simulated by the spreading of activation
within the network.
Decision Finally the decision-maker perceives the most consistent representation
of the network as it results as the most coherent option among alternatives which is
in turn selected accordingly.
Betsch (2005) conveys that parallel constraint satisfaction principles which are
foremost based upon automatic processes may be also deliberately influenced in the
process of making a decision:
First, deliberate processes can draw explicit attention to specific information. This
in turn can lead to information integration within the network, modification of
information validity and changes within the linkage between concepts.
Second, partly conscious processes might be relevant in modifying representations
and last, the author points out that the decision-maker chooses the most coherent
option deliberately based on underlying representations.
Simon and Holyoak (2002) claim that the capability of connectionist represen-
tations capture rich and large conceptual structures whereas the relation to the
person’s background knowledge constitutes important progress over the restrictive
dyads and triads of yesteryear. Furthermore the author argues that interactive
constraint-satisfaction algorithms provide a more realistic and nuanced means of re-
solving consistency than the crude mathematical rules used by consistency theorists.
Accordingly, as suggested by Read and Miller (1994); Read et al. (1997), connectionist-
based models of thought building upon constraint satisfaction, offer a conceptual
framework that overcomes the limitations that hobbled cognitive consistency theo-
ries, most notably, the difficulty of generalizing such theories to achieve coherence
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among large networks of beliefs.
These findings lend support to the assumed likeliness that coherence-driven mech-
anisms of constraint satisfaction may also be applied in connectionist terms for
approaching inferences in the setting of unconscious decision-making processes.
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) argue in the same direction:
“Up to now, we have discovered that unconscious thought leads to
polarization and that people are better able to organize information in
memory with unconscious than with conscious thought. This knowledge,
however, represents no more than the tip of the iceberg, and there is much
more about the processes involved that remain to be discovered. For now,
it is perhaps best to conceive of unconscious thought as a computational
process, as slowly calculating what is best.”
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Hypothesis
“From its seeming to me – or to everyone – to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so.
What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein in Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner (2005)
Herewith I offer the following hypothesis:
1. Decision-making can be described by the evolvement of (parallel) processes
that maximize coherence under given constraints and is the result of interac-
tions of automatic- as well as deliberate processes;
2. Unconscious moments within the thought-process involved in complex decision-
making follow a function of maximal coherence among the underlying infer-
ences and are key for a better understanding of the phenomenon.
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Chapter 5
Evidence
“‘I refuse to prove that I exist,’ says God, ‘for proof denies faith, and without faith
I am nothing.’
‘But,’ says Man, ‘The Babel fish is a dead giveaway, isn’t it? It could not have
evolved by chance. It proves you exist, and so therefore, by your own arguments,
you don’t. QED.’
‘Oh dear,’ says God, ‘I hadn’t thought of that,’ and promptly disappears in a puff of
logic.”
Douglas Adams in “The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy.”
5.1 Coherence shifts
Evidence for the existence of coherence mechanisms within decision-making pro-
cesses under complex circumstances comes foremost from Dan Simon and colleagues
(Holyoak and Simon (1999), Simon et al. (2001), Simon et al. (2004a); Simon (2004)).
Holyoak and Simon (1999) show that tasks such as deciding which job offer to ac-
cept involve sets of complex inferences that need to be integrated within the decision.
They examine inference-based decision-making by asking college students to render
a verdict in a complex legal case. Their principle finding is that the decision-making
process is accompanied by a systematic change in the evaluation of the inferences
towards a pattern of coherence in the emerging decision.
Simon et al. (2001) replicate and extend these findings in delineating that the
processing of complex tasks is accompanied by changes in inferences that increases
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coherence with the decision made, leading to a coherent representation of the situ-
ation.
That is, the inferences which support the chosen decision becomes stronger, and the
inferences that support the rejected decision decreases in their level of acceptance.
The authors conclude that when people are facing tasks of high ambiguity, conflict
and complexity – conditions that might otherwise be experienced as insuperable –
the increase of coherence in support for one of the decision alternatives enables and
facilitates the making of confident decisions.
Further, Simon et al. (2004a); Read et al. (2003) highlight that people increase co-
herence even in the process of making a decision.
This is especially crucial as those coherence shifts cannot be explained by models
of rational choice nor heuristics. Those models assume the stability of presented
stimuli throughout the process of deciding (Glo¨ckner et al., 2010).
Glo¨ckner and Betsch (2008) summarize findings regarding consistency maximiz-
ing principles in various decision-making scenarios delineated by Simon et al. (2004a)
as outlined in the following:
• With the emergence of the decision task, the mental representation
of the task shifts towards a state of internal consistency (coher-
ence shifts): the information that supports the emerging decision
is accepted, and the information that supports the alternative is
devalued or ignored;
• People are not aware of these coherence shifts, and the ensuing deci-
sion is “experienced as rationally warranted by the inherent values
of the variables, rather than by an inflated perception imposed by
the cognitive system” (outlined by Simon (2004, p. 545));
• These coherence shifts, which are caused by consistency maximizing
processes, “play an operative role in the decision process” (outlined
by Simon (2004, p. 546));
• Consistency maximizing processes influence information directly in-
volved in the decision, as well as beliefs and background knowledge;
• Changes in one aspect of the mental model may trigger changes in
other information throughout the model because pieces of informa-
tion are interdependent;
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• Motivation and attitudes can influence the direction of coherence
shifts;
• Coherence shifts caused by consistency maximizing processes are of
a transitory nature since they are produced to solve the decision
task at hand, but usually disappear after a certain time;
• Deliberate instructions to consider the opposite position reduce the
size of coherence shifts.
According to these findings it seems likely that human cognition incorporates
mechanisms of automatic consistency maximizing principles in order to “make sense”
by arranging information in a way that constructs the most coherent picture of the
(decision-) situation.
5.2 Parallel Constraint Satisfaction predictions
Evidence in regard to the existence and predictions of parallel constraint satisfaction
mechanisms come additionally from Glo¨ckner (2006); Holyoak and Simon (1999) and
are delineated by Glo¨ckner (2008):
High computational capacity Individuals are able to integrate quickly
a multitude of information by relying on automatic processes.
Coherence shifts The decision process is inherently constructivist. Sub-
jective cue validities are changed in the decision process to fit the
emerging representation of the decision task, resulting in coherence
shifts (Simon, 2004): cues that point away from the favored option
are devalued and cues that support the favored option are strength-
ened. Thus, resulting cue validities depend on the structure of the
decision task and differ from initial cue validities.
Approximation of weighted compensatory models Choices roughly
approximate the weighted compensatory integration of cue values
and cue validities.
Decision time differences Decision time increases with a decrease in
the initial consistency between the pieces of information. If all cues
point towards the same option, consistency is high and decision time
short. If almost equally strong sets of cues favor different options,
consistency is low and decision time long.
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Confidence judgment differences The subjective confidence in a choice
is higher in decision tasks when the consistency among pieces of in-
formation that cannot be resolved in the PCS process is low. If
a highly consistent solution is found, confidence is high; if the re-
sulting interpretation is still rather inconsistent, confidence in the
decision remains low.
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Discussion
“As the emerging consensus in cognitive science, it [the review] begins with the obser-
vation that the mind consists of many independent modules doing their own things
in parallel.”
Anderson et al. (2004, p. 1057)
As much of this discussion bases upon recent research within a reasonable young
field of research, the author concedes in advance that the discussion remains specu-
lative.
6.1 Single-strategy or multiple-strategy decisions?
There is intensive ongoing debate about the feasibility of multiple-strategy decision-
making processes like the fast-and-frugal heuristics (FFH) program (Gigerenzer et al.
(1999); Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009)) on the one hand, and the applicability and
descriptive potential of a single-strategy as for example proposed by the parallel
constraint satisfaction model by Glo¨ckner (2008) on the other.
According to the latter, the FFH program lacks the potential to deal with instable
cues. That is, heuristics assume that people reason starting off from the evaluation
and validation of presented or already incorporated cues first before making a choice
but not the other way around (Glo¨ckner et al., 2010, p. 441; p. 455). This pinpoints
the nature of unidirectional information processing and serves as common ground for
a variety of heuristics described in the literature as for example by Tversky (1972);
Simon (1955); Payne et al. (1988); Gigerenzer et al. (1999). Those heuristics only
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differ within their approaches to describe information search, integration, stopping
search and, ultimately, choice. To that end they assume that only given information
at hand account for underlying constraints, inferences and the evolvement of the
decision process.
Glo¨ckner et al. (2010) fundamental critic targets the assumption that heuristics
proposed so far do not have the potential to account for the empirical evidence of
coherence shifts (see section 5.1). They demand a bidirectional, reciprocal processing
approach as for example within a connectionist framework to be accounted for.
Specifically Marewski (2010) argues that Glo¨ckner et al. (2010) incorrectly assert
that their proposed connectionist PCS model is comprehensive enough to account
for decision-making on a wide scale across various scenarios and tasks. In his belief
several key aspects of the PCS model do not hold or are misconceived. Marewski
defends the position that heuristics are in fact suitable to make quantitative, well
studied predictions to address the phenomenon and conjectures:
“[...] (i) contrary to their [Glo¨ckner et al. (2010)]assertions the FFH
and other multi-strategy frameworks have developed a number of ap-
proaches to strategy selection, tackling a difficult modeling problem that
the PCS model disguises but cannot solve itself. Moreover, (ii) in con-
trast to the PCS model, which has not been completely spelled out,
the repertoire of strategies assumed by the FFH framework is precisely
defined, allowing researchers to make quantitative predictions about be-
havior. I conclude that Glo¨ckner et al. (2010) critique may actually apply
more to the PCS approach and less to the FFH framework.”
Marewski anticipates that the PCS model as described as an all purpose mecha-
nism still runs into the strategy selection problem. According to him, the model lacks
the description of processes determining the information search or stopping rules
which are not described by parallel constraint satisfaction mechanisms as stated
by for example Glo¨ckner (2008). He highlights that the FFH program in return
hypothesizes that people select different heuristics as a function of the environment:
“[...] In doing so, it asks (i) when and why a given heuristic would
help a person to behave adaptively, for example, by enabling that person
to make accurate or fast inferences and (ii) under what conditions people
rely on a heuristic” (Marewski, 2010).
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Marewski proceeds in his claim that critics in regard to the FFH framework and
its inability to account for bidirectional reasoning processes is wrong. He highlights
that the adaptive toolbox does include compensatory integration strategies - such
as tallying - as well as models that allow for bidirectional reasoning and changes in
cues (Hoffrage and Hertwig, 1999).
Betsch and Glo¨ckner (2010) critically discuss Marewski (2010) raised objec-
tions against the single-strategy parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) approach to
decision-making. The former come to the conclusion that the aforementioned raised
issues by Marewski (i) the FFH frameworks’ factual ability to account for coherence
shifts and (ii) the critique that ultimately the PCS model runs into a strategy selec-
tion problem due to underspecification of underlying processes do not hold and are
misconceived.
Betsch and Glo¨ckner (2010) acknowledge Marewski’s initially raised point that
the “Reconstruction after Feedback with Take The Best” (RAFT) heuristic is ca-
pable of modifying cue values. However, and this is crucial, the cue values get
modified only after the decision is made. This entails that RAFT cannot account
for the empirical findings of coherence shifts. Bidirectional reasoning, the assumed
underlying mechanism for coherence shifts, happens already during the decision-
making process. Secondly, Betsch and Glo¨ckner (2010) underline the nature of the
PCS model - against Marewski’s assertion - as a sufficient single strategy approach
to decision-making. They claim that according to the PCS rule persons translate
provided information into an internal mental representation according to a specific
monotonic transformation function and elaborate their argument further (Betsch
and Glo¨ckner, 2010, p. 470):
“To conceptually deal with this phenomenon, we suggested a differ-
entiation between an information integration and decision rule, on the
one hand, and processes of information search, generation, and change
on the other. We subsumed the latter operations under the concept of
deliberative construction. We propose that there is only one-all-purpose
rule for the core processes of decision making (information integration
and choice), whereas there is a variety of different methods of deliberative
construction.”
Betsch and Glo¨ckner (2010) reject the critics regarding their delineated PCS
model in that it has to deal with the strategy selection problem while it treats pro-
cesses of information search, generation and change like different forms of behavior
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that are selected by the applied single PCS rule. In an advanced version of the
model, Glo¨ckner (2008) draw a more elaborate picture on the interplay of decision
mechanisms among different choice options and the concept of deliberate construc-
tion.
Ultimately, the connectionist PCS model of choice and decision-making is based
upon an automatic parallel processing mechanism which operates on information
cues that are integrated holistically to form the most coherent picture of the decision-
making scenario based upon maximizing constraints (see section 3.3).
On a more general level the PCS approach assumes that information cues do
not only exclusively affect the criterion evaluation, but that this evaluation has an
influences back on how the information cue is evaluated. This resonates with empir-
ical evidence from crucial real life scenarios, like for example in legal affairs where
arguments from complex criminal cases are evaluated (Holyoak and Simon, 1999).
The PCS model holistically assumes that cognitive processes interact with infor-
mation cues in a bidirectional way. They influence each other in a reciprocal fashion
by taking into account unconscious elements. This in turn marks a significant dif-
ference between heuristic strategies and the parallel constraint satisfaction approach
within decision formation.
6.2 Intuitive moments in complex decision-making
6.2.1 Potential of automatic-intuitive decision-making strategies
On a general note it should be highlighted that the current state of research in
the area of intuitive moments within the phenomenon of decision-making is still in
an early stage. Hence, it is difficult to generalize findings and one has to be very
cautious in making claims and predictions.
Nevertheless it appears legitimate to assume that automatic-intuitive decision
strategies can in fact result in good decisions under distinct circumstances: Di-
jksterhuis Loran F (2006) suggest that decision-making works best by integrating
conscious and unconscious thought within complex decision circumstances.
The parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model (see for example Glo¨ckner (2008))
start to lead the way towards a descriptive framework aiming to shed light towards a
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better understanding of the power of an intuitive component within the phenomenon
(see Figure 6.1 on page 45 and Figure 6.2 on page 46 accordingly).
It delineates a framework that the human decision maker does perform high capacity
information- and integration processing due to the interaction of both, deliberative
and automatic processes in order to maximize overall coherence. This conception
might have its origin within evolution theory as assumed by Glo¨ckner (2008), and
is schematically outlined in Figure 6.1 on page 45 and Figure 6.2 on page 46.
Figure 6.1: The figure summarizes the mechanisms of the proposed PCS rule within
a PCS network according to Glo¨ckner (2008).
In order to highlight the relevance, I will set out for a more detailed overview
of advantages in regard to automatic-intuitive moments within the decision-making
phenomenon:
Dealing with complexity and inconsistent environments There is com-
pelling evidence in the literature (see section 2.1.2) that people are able to success-
fully deal with complex and dynamic problems with the use of internal, automatic
processes. Those internal processes are assumed to be describable by parallel con-
straint satisfaction principles aiming at maximizing overall consistency among the
decision scenario. In this regard a reductionist approach lead by heuristics following
principles of reduced minimal information processing appears less compelling. Re-
sults have shown that automatic-intuitive decision strategies are capable to deliver
good results even within complex environments which are prone to inconsistent and
missing information (Nordgren et al., 2011).
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Figure 6.2: The figure outlines the interaction mechanisms between the primary and
secondary network within a PCS network model (Glo¨ckner and Betsch, 2008).
Importance of social dimension and creativity Intuitive moments seem to
be highly relevant also within social perception. Read et al. (2003); Simon et al.
(2004b) argue in a plausible way that parallel constraint satisfaction mechanisms
are active in order to integrate vast amount of information quickly including subtle
signals in the process of social interaction and the establishment of relationships.
It is further assumed that the activation of partly automatic consistency maximizing
processes form out similar concepts, mental representations and changed information
constellations. Therefore it seems plausible that the discussed PCS approach triggers
information synthesis processes that increase the likelihood of constructing creative
solutions to decision problems (Thagard and Stewart, 2010).
Tight relation to own value system The application of automatic-intuitive
decision-strategies act upon unconscious goals, beliefs and values of the decision-
maker. Consequently those strategies exercise a much closer relation and tight
connection to a person’s value system as that might be the case for example with
deliberate-rational decision processes. This implies that intuitive driven decision ap-
proaches activate relevant representations similar to the already incorporated value
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system of this person. On the contrary, reductionist strategies might not be able
to account for basic underlying goals and values due to limitations in the depth
of alternative evaluations (see for example Tversky and Kahneman (1974)). This
might explain the reason for sharing a personal, subjective deep commitment to
automatic strategies and hence intuitive decisions. Needless to say this behavior
might comprise also substantial downsides. To trust only decisions that base on
incorporated goals and values can also be radically misleading especially if the de-
cision taken deals with a situation with limited or no previous experience (see for
example Klein (1999)). Negative aspects of automatic-intuitive decision-strategies
are further discussed in section 6.2.2.
6.2.2 Automatic-intuitive decision-making strategy challenges
Biased representation through activation and salience factors Glo¨ckner
and Witteman (2010, p. 16) describe the influence of salience factors which may re-
sult in increased activation of respective information cues. This can be challenging
since salience factors might influence the information cue in a manner dispropor-
tional to its ecological validity. In other words the validation of a cue might be un-
reasonably increased from a set of given information because it is weighted stronger
due to its prominent positioning. This in turn results in biased mental information
representations leading to decisions with decreased quality.
The pitfall of conditioning Another risk factor in intuitive decision strate-
gies are conditioning affects which may result as an example from advertisements.
Walther (2002) for example suggests that conditioning processes may trigger inad-
equate emotional reactions connected to specific cues which may result in a biased
representation of the overall decision situation thus leading to suboptimal decision
outcomes.
The role of experience Experience is valuable and highly desirable, but can
be misleading especially in the context of automatic-intuitive decision strategies.
Fiedler (2000) outlines the necessity that information which is integrated and acti-
vated within mental representations is correct. Thus it is suggested that experts use
and trust their intuition in a context where decisions have to be made based on a
wide range of experience whereas novices are better off in using a deliberate-rational
decision making approach (Klein, 1999; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Dijksterhuis
Loran F, 2006).
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6.3 PCS processes and their descriptive potential
6.3.1 Why should intuitive decision-making be predictive?
In the following section I discuss different positions regarding the question if, and
to what extend, decision-making processes may be predictable.
The following authors argue against the predictability of a decision-making out-
come:
Thomae (1960) suggests that decision-making processes exist rather as functions
of an actual experienced situation in which they are shaped and continuously modi-
fied by the situations’ direction, intensity and meaning. Further, memories, feelings
or thoughts are unique entities that do not exist in the exactly same way twice.
For this reason, Thomae asserts it is impossible to describe the relation between an
action and the mental state that caused it in a law like fashion.
Spaemann (1996) argues that it is wrong to assume ideas, desires or motives as
independent variables. According to him, the decision-making process must be seen
as a dynamic process that encompasses the modification and the reciprocal influence
of those variables. Crucially, they cannot exist as fixed determinants.
Fuchs (2005) highlights the crucial interaction of a conscious (explicit, verbaliza-
tion) and an unconscious (implicit, intuitive) component which mutually influence
and expedite one another. Fuchs further explains that decision-making processes
cannot be the product of deliberate thought and reasoning by itself. In his view
reasons rather serve the purpose to justify decisions for oneself and are not enough
to reach a “sound” felt decision outcome.
Fuchs concludes that decision-making cannot be described as either a rational-
discursive nor as an irrational-blind process, but rather as an emerging form of felt
congruity which he describes as a form of incomputable sense-making. Therewith
Fuchs argues against a psychological deterministic viewpoint in which the calcula-
tion of decision outcomes in advance becomes in practice possible. Yet his narration
and understanding of decision-making remarkably comprises in my view of striking
analogies to the concept of coherence and parallel constraint satisfaction principles
according to Thagard (2000).
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Thagard proposes cognitive naturalism as the rising approach to philosophy that
finds close ties between philosophy and the cognitive sciences, including psychol-
ogy, neuroscience, linguistics and artificial intelligence (Thagard, 2000). Cognitive
naturalism is intended to supersede behavioral and logical naturalism, but is com-
patible with non-exclusionary social and physical naturalism. Within, Thagard sees
philosophical ideas about coherence to be highly relevant to the understanding of
important psychological phenomena, while computational ideas greatly enrich the
understanding of coherence and offer a formal account to model and predict decision-
making including intuitive and emotional shares (Thagard, 2008).
In this regard Thagard argues that cognitive naturalism in fact supersedes analytic
philosophy as well as phenomenology and points the way towards ongoing cooper-
ation and co-evolution of philosophy and psychology. For a more detailed critical
discussion of Thagard’s position please see section 6.3.2.
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) propose a theory about human thought named
the “Unconscious Thought Theory” (UTT). In comparison their model distinguishes
the thought process into an unconscious and a conscious mode of thought. Within,
conscious thought is defined as a cognitive thought process that is object-relevant or
task-relevant and occurs while the object or task is in one’s conscious attention. In
contrast unconscious thought is an object-relevant or task-relevant thought process
that occurs while conscious attention is directed elsewhere. The two modes differ in
its characteristic and are ergo preferable under different circumstances.
Interestingly, the theory suggests that when dealing with simple issues one should
use conscious thought, whereas decisions in complex circumstances should be tack-
led by unconscious thought.
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) suggest this conclusion based on the identifi-
cation of key principles pertaining to the nature of two types of thought:
1. The capacity principle states that conscious thought is constrained by the low
capacity of consciousness whereas the unconscious capacity is much higher. It
follows that conscious thought processes take into account only a subset of the
information that it should;
2. The bottom-up-versus-top-down principle that claims the unconscious works
aschematically bottom-up to slowly integrate information to form an objective
summary judgment while conscious thought works schematically top-down and
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is guided by expectancies and schemas;
3. The weighting principle that suggests that unconscious naturally weights the
relative importance of various attributes whereas conscious thought often leads
to suboptimal weighting because it disturbs this natural process;
4. The rule principle suggests that conscious thought is precise and can follow
strict rules while unconscious thought gives rough estimates;
5. The convergence-versus-divergence principle which claims that conscious thought
is focused and convergent while unconscious thought operates more divergent.
Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) further set out to describe circumstances in
that different modes of thinking lead to different kind of results. Even if their
framework has not yet been spelled out in precise mathematical detail, it takes a bold
stand on the importance of the interrelatedness between deliberative and intuitive
thought, whereas parallels to PCS mechanisms become increasingly evident.
6.3.2 Objections against a Thagardian coherentist position
The connectionist implementation of parallel constraint satisfaction principles is
based upon the concept of coherence. The field is pioneered by the idea of “explana-
tory coherence” by Thagard (1989) who later applied the model specifically to the
phenomenon of decision-making (Thagard and Millgram, 1995).
Coherentism as such has undergone severe opposition especially from the posi-
tion of foundationalism.
In a coherentist view no foundations of knowledge exist. Hence the certainty of
knowledge does not base upon foundations but by the strength of interlinkage of
propositions. The coherent position’s assumption is that mutual inference mark the
cornerstone of empirical beliefs. It follows that the degree of justification of a belief
emerges from as to what extend it coheres with other beliefs one holdes. Thus, the
coherent position rejects the view that there do exist foundations of knowledge as
basic belief itself does not exist as foundationalists claim.
Laurence BonJour became one of the most prominent defenders of the foun-
dationalist position. He concludes that “coherentism is pretty obviously untenable,
indeed hopeless” (BonJour, 1999). Contrary to this view Thagard (2000) strength-
ens the position of coherentism in that foundationalism does not have a chance of
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competing with coherentism in an account of human consciousness with its various
manifestations (Amini, 2003). In opposition to BonJour, Thagard observes that “the
foundational search for certainty is pointless, and that what matters is the growth
of knowledge, not its foundations” (Thagard, 2000, p. 90). Thagard asserts the
key to the growth of knowledge and to its very understanding is nothing other than
coherence, where in a similar epistemic exercise foundationalism “has undoubtedly
failed” (Thagard, 2000, p. 8).
To shed some more light on the criticism and discussion regarding the theoretical
foundation of coherence, some more considerations shall be outlined:
“There has not been much of an account what exactly coherence itself
is. The problem were not synonymous or words or phrases like if ones
beliefs cohere if they “hang together” or ones goals make up a coherent
plan if they “fit well with one another” - the problem was not even
that of itemizing the ingredients of coherence such as appropriateness of
means to ends or logical consistency. The problem was the lack of any
specification of how these ingredients were to be calculated and combined
with respect to a set of propositions. That is, how one was supposed to
work out the degree each item on the list would contribute to the overall
coherence of a theory or strategy (Amini, 2003).”
It is evident, however, that without a detailed and sufficient account on how
to compute to choose the most coherent set of thoughts or actions, the theory of
coherence is not capable in order to contribute to a deeper understanding of human
thinking and behavior. Putnam (1981) claims that “[...] coherence is not something
for which we have an algorithm, but is something that we ultimately judge” and was
convinced that feeding the basic concept of coherence into a computer program to
do simulations is beyond of reach. Against this background Thagard’s attempt to
characterize coherence “as mathematically precise as the tools of deductive logic and
probability theory” (Thagard, 2000, p. 16) becomes interesting and appealing.
Thagard is well aware of the fact that there are several objections against his
coherence theory. The majority of critics are directed towards vagueness, indiscrimi-
nateness, isolation, conservatism, circularity and truth of the theory (Thagard, 2000,
p. 69). Even though Thagard most convincingly defends the theory of coherence
regarding aforementioned raised issues, it is vital to add to the discussion that to
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some extend fuzziness about the interrelation of coherence and truth still remains
since approximating maximum coherence is not yet the same thing as approximating
truth (Amini, 2003).
To defend coherentism against this blind spot Thagard acknowledges that one inher-
ently needs “to see a much fuller account of the conditions under which progressively
coherent theories can be said to approximate the truth” (Thagard, 2000, p. 280).
To sum up, Thagard is able to set the scene for coherence in a constructive and
insightful way. Yet it has to be added that this is only achieved by “extensively
curtailing traditional claims of coherentism” (Amini, 2003), which Thagard demon-
strates convincingly even by confessing that “the formation of elements such as
propositions and concepts and the construction of constraints relations between ele-
ments depend on processes to which coherence is only indirectly relevant” (Thagard,
2000, p. 24).
6.4 Differentiation between “implicit” and “explicit”
Preliminary considerations A decision is an interesting process. Not only from
a technical or psychological point of view where we strive to understand the various
mechanisms that undergo the process of actively deciding, or more passively arriving
at a decision.
From a phenomenological stand we know how it feels to face a decision that has to
be made in a complex situation we do not fully understand, in an environment too
ambivalent to fully comprehend. An yet, we end up deciding within those circum-
stances, resulting in either good or rather not as good as envisioned outcomes.
The point I would like to make here is that in the process of deciding we seem to
commit ourselves to one option while cutting off all others. My understanding is we
experience a transition within the decision process from a context of uncertainty to-
wards certainty. Metaphorically speaking, our implicit selves become explicit within
the process of deciding.
But how does his jump of quality come about, when does the decision arrive in the
external world, affecting the world?
This subjective view on the issue is contrasted by a materialistic position that
describes the world in exclusively naturalistic terms.
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Some neuroscientists (see Doyle (2009) for an overview) argue in favor of this concep-
tualization. In their perception neuronal processes are purely physical deterministic
actions. In this view the act of deciding is represented exclusively by neuronal ac-
tivity which only could have happened this way. Subjective feelings and thought are
rather seen as an epiphenomenon, an accessory by-product ruling out any chance of
subjectivity.
Within this exclusively naturalistic description it seems likely to believe the deci-
sion was already determined and therefore always explicit – no transition from the
subjective to objective, from implicit to explicit is taking place.
Since I try to investigate how the implicit becomes explicit, which obviously
requires a subjective component, I cannot accept a materialistic monism. In my
view, Quantum Theory expands this naturalistic view and scientific explanation in
that it re-introduces to some degree subjectivity through the element of randomness
through quantum events. The theory entails the study of quantum mechanics which
is currently at the forefront of modern science striving to shed light on ambitious
matters like for example the relationship between subjective conscious moments and
physical brain processes (see for example Atmanspacher (2004); Litt et al. (2006)).
Evidence in this regard comes from in section 3.2.1 described Gestalt psychology.
Atmanspacher (2004) for example argues that bistable perception as in the case of
the “Necker cube illusion” is formally similar to quantum entanglement.
Regarding decision-making, quantum mechanical characteristics and structural sim-
ilarities have been lately highlighted by scientists (Roth, 2001; Busemeyer et al.,
2006; Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009; Ule, 2009; Agrawal and Sharda, 2010).
However efforts to define and explain those concepts and functionalities all too
often appear to be much of the same as nailing a pudding against a wall and should
not be attempted here.
I earlier outlined the connections between the concept of coherence and its interplay
and relevance in the process of decision-making.
Yet in addition I would like to put forward a few conceptual matters originating
from recent argumentations in favor of the descriptive potential of quantum me-
chanics. This said, I hope to foster an ongoing challenging discussion in pinpointing
towards some in my opinion inherent appealing quantum mechanical sentiments.
This account strives to contribute towards a better understanding of how humans
ultimately do decisions on various levels. Given the nature of things my thoughts
53
Chapter 6. Discussion 54
should be acknowledged as being speculative and contemplation demands caution
as well as further empirical investigation.
Thus, the following discussion consequently aims to pinpoint a basic notion of
discrimination between “implicitness” and “explicitness” from a philosophical per-
spective. Specific focus is given on their interrelated role within decision-making
and the development of a notion of process including its relevance within.
6.4.1 Whitehead’s process philosophy as a starting point for debate
A compelling discussion of quantum mechanics in regard to decision-making would
go way beyond the frame and scope of this work, some thoughts touching upon the
surface, however, might serve as an anchor point within the discourse. The author’s
intention is to add to the understanding of the fascinating broad spectrum of com-
plexity, multi-layeredness and interdisciplinarity regarding the phenomenon.
I start with the philosophical discussion of Alfred North Whitehead’s process
philosophy and some of his metaphysical-laden thoughts on human experience and
reality. Whitehead likely did not know about the developments in quantum mechan-
ics by that time by Heisenberg, Dirac and Schro¨dinger since he never mentioned
them in his writings. Yet there are striking parallels between Whitehead’s ideas and
Quantum Theory which appear to be more actual and relevant today than ever.
As a next step I investigate some very specific metaphysical Whiteheadian concepts
and relate them to the process of decision-making.
The philosopher Alfred North Whitehead accounts as one of the most influential
figures in modern philosophy. At the same time Whitehead is also often suspected
to be (unjustly) the most neglected philosopher in 20th century history. His major
philosophical work Process and Reality(Whitehead, 1978) contests of a metaphysical
framework of process philosophy, initially intended as a Philosophy of organism.
Within, Whiteheads concept of process remains key:
“The many become one, and are increased by one. In their natures,
entities are disjunctively “many” in process of passage to conjunctive
unity. This category of the ultimate replaces Aristotles’ category of pri-
mary substance” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 21).
54
55 6.4. Differentiation between “implicit” and “explicit”
Generally speaking, Whitehead maintains an understanding on how human ex-
perience might serve to understand reality which he arguably views to be a process
of becoming.
Whitehead’s view asserts that substance does not exist. One is tempted to ask how
anything can exist if not substances, what else could exist? Whitehead maintains
the perspective that everything is process and that the only thing that is real are
events.
However, from a classical Newtonian perspective where matter is seen to be build
up from atoms as building blocks of substance it appears to be at best challenging
to accept the doctrine that nothing undergoes process. Whiteheadians argue the
appearing of substances as enduring matter is rather the result of our limited view
similar to food that rots.
Whiteheads process ontology suggests that atoms are made up of subatomic par-
ticles which in fact are build up from protons, neutrons and electrons. In turn they
are made up of quarks. If we follow Whitehead, matter itself is made up of energy
which is not seen as substance but rather as relationships between objects. Since
objects are build up of matter which is made up of energy which is made up of rela-
tionships, we are stuck in a loop. The universe appears to be a set of relationships
between relationships between relationships, which all change constantly over time
and never appear to be static.
Accordingly, Whitehead argues substance does not undergo process. Rather
processes and what we call substances are merely a temporary pattern produced by
process.
Klose (2009) anticipates in reference to Whitehead’s philosophical concepts that
distinctions must dissolve between inside and outside, consciousness and matter, ob-
ject and subject.
I will take this as a starting point in elaborating Whitehead’s ideas regarding a
philosophical account for the interrelation between “implicit” and “explicit” which
in my view also applies to the decision-making phenomenon.
To further follow the road of quantum mechanics I turn to one of the founders
of quantum mechanics, Walter Heisenberg, and his quantum ontology. Heisenberg
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postulates in his book Physics and Philosophy :
“[...] the transition from the “possible” to the “actual” takes place
during the act of observation” (Heisenberg, 1976, p. 54-55).
And further:
“The probability function combines objective and subjective elements.
It contains statements about possibilities or better tendencies (“poten-
tia” in Aristotelian philosophy), and these are completely objective, [...]
and it contains statements about our knowledge of the system, which
of course are subjective in so far as they may be different for different
observers. [...] The observation itself changes the probability function
discontinuously; it selects of all possible events the actual one that has
taken place. Since through the observation our knowledge of the system
has changed discontinuously, its mathematical representation has also
undergone the discontinuous change and we may speak of a ’quantum
jump”’(Heisenberg, 1976, p. 53-54).
Here we arrive at the heartbeat of Quantum Theory. I believe it is key here to
understand the room of subjectivity that quantum mechanics grands. Subjectivity
and objectivity, implicitness and explicitness do not mutually exclude each other
within this framework and understanding. Rather they are dual states which, em-
pirically demonstrable, co-exist to some extend (French and Taylor, 1979).
Ule (2009) turns principles of quantum mechanics into a practical framework to
describe elements of group decision-making and delineates the undergoing process:
“The process [of group decision-making] can be compared to the col-
lapse of a wave function in quantum mechanics, which due to the in-
fluence of measuring the space of potential activations of the physical
system is reduced to one of the possibilities. The structure of implicit
values of different possibilities (alternatives) of functioning is adequate
for the space of potentiality, but these alternatives do not appear as el-
ements of logical disjunction but rather as some sort of “entanglement”
of possibilities which is resolved only by the process of decision making
or more precisely by the viewpoints and arguments in the discussion and
the energizing of the discussion” (Ule, 2009).
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In the Whiteheadian ontology of Quantum Theory, each quantum reduction
event is identified with a Whiteheadian actual entity:
“The actual world is a process, and [...] the process is the becoming
of actual entities” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 22).
“[The actual entities] are the final real things of which the world is
made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more
real” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 18).
Whitehead’s notion of actual entities are in respect of the context also known as
“actual occasions”, “throbs of experience” or “pulses of experience” and are accord-
ing to Whitehead the “atoms of reality”.
Further, each Whiteheadian actual entity consists of a “mental pole” and a “phys-
ical pole”. The mental pole is an intentional ascertaining action which separates a
continuum into discrete experienceable possibilities. The physical pole thereafter
selects, or to use Whitehead’s notion, actualizes one of the previously identified pos-
sibilities and destroys all others.
Whitehead continues to explain his notion of potentiality and actuality:
“Continuity concerns what is potential, whereas actuality is incurably
discrete” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 61).
“Actual entities [...] make real what was antecedently merely poten-
tial” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 72).
“Every decision is referred to one or more actual entities [...] Actu-
ality is decision amid potentiality”(Whitehead, 1978, p. 43).
Within this conceptualization a mental pole comprises of an input and an out-
put. Whitehead describes those in- and outputs as ontological characterizations of
feelings, thoughts and ideas and are “essential within the dynamical role of unify-
ing, evaluating, and selecting discrete classically conceivable activities from among
the continuous range of potentialities offered by the operation of the physically de-
scribable laws”(Atmanspacher, 2006). As a practical example of this assertions, an
actual entity, so Atmanspacher, is an event whose mental pole can be experienced by
a human being within a conscious stream of events whereas its physical pole refers to
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the neural correlate of that experiential event. Here the parallels between a White-
headian process philosophy and quantum mechanical properties as entanglement
become obvious:
“When one follows, point by point, the characteristics of actual en-
tities, one is amazed to what extend one can think of collapse as an
objectivized actual entity” (Myrvold et al., 2009).
After those outlined anchor points I state the following question:
Is it possible that if we combine Whitehead’s process philosophy with quantum the-
ory and relate it to actual entities within a decision-making process, that the act of
transition from the potential to the actual, which can be described as the collapse
of a wave function in quantum mechanical terms be understood as the initially de-
scribed blackspot where the implicit decision at stake becomes explicit? And how
in specific could this look like in more coherent descriptive terms?
I will not attempt myself to ultimately answer those questions here. On a per-
sonal note I conceive Whitehead’s ontologies as intuitively appealing. Yet I acknowl-
edge its inherent speculative character and agree with Myrvold et al. (2009) in that
filling in the technical details of this ontology is the long-term task of science, which
is still in its infancy. A lot of important structure is provided by the general precepts
of the ontology, but this skeletal outline needs, of course, much fleshing out.
6.4.2 From potentiality to actuality within a coherentist setting
Chalmers (1996, p. 333) asserts that quantum mechanics is deeply connected with
the notion of observership, and that this notion is crucial for people believing that
the two phenomena share a common source as it involves the relation between a
subject’s experience and the rest of the world.
Andrej Ule recently presented and discussed interrelations between the two phenom-
ena of quantum mechanics and consciousness in his essay “Mind in Physical Reality,
its Potentiality and Actuality” (Ule, 2012). Within, the author investigates the na-
ture of consciousness and explores mutual explanatory benefits of the phenomena
with specific emphasis on the conceptual notions of “potentiality” and “actuality”
within process.
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Andre Ule highlights that processual reasoning is often incomplete. According
to his view it is not possible to know all sequences of the reasoning process phases
or its result:
“We know only parts of the successive results of the process and/or
only some of its phases. In such cases, we know only a type or a scheme
of the process. It presents the equivalence class of the possible pro-
cesses in the given referential system of occurrences regarding a fixed
sequence of times, structure of phases and/or subsequent results of pro-
cesses. It is quite typical of process reasoning that we consider only some
types (schemes) of processes but not the particular processes. Processual
thinking is thus mostly abstract and schematic” (Ule, 2012, p. 10).
Essentially, the author argues that many occurrences in a real process are only
partially being determined by previous occurrences and that for any microphysical
process the possibilities of a state-change are given by the nature of the process and
coded in the wave function of the quantum state or in the matrix of the probability
densities of possible outcomes of measurement (Ule, 2012).
Ule elaborates further on different systems and state changes:
“In simple referential systems (e.g. in deterministic systems), the
potential for change depends only on the properties of the starting states
of the system (and on the time interval for possible occurrences). In some
stochastic system and other more complex systems (e.g. in the majority
of life processes) the potential for change also depends on the properties
of processes which led to the given state of the system [italics added] and
not only on the properties of the system states. I am then speaking of
the “potential of processes” (Ule, 2012, p. 10).
Accordingly, I believe the above mentioned “potential of process” conception
plays a major role in decision-making especially when decisions are substantially
based on unconscious processes as it is the case if decisions are done intuitively.
I speculate that a system change in a decision-making model which strives to not
only predict but explains the decision-making process, it needs to take into account
the properties of all (or more realistic as much as possible) processes which lead to
a system state (decision).
I suspect that the emergent properties in place when making a decision become bet-
ter understandable and traceable when appreciating the conceptual considerations
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on the potential of processes. Thus we might be well advised to build and improve
decision-making models respectively for better performance and improved predic-
tion quality.
On a general note, Ule (2012) anticipates that by linking questions of conscious-
ness with questions of quantum mechanics we are linking two mysteries in the hope
they will somehow shed light on each other, thus making us a little wiser than we
are now.
This said, I now turn to put forward my thoughts about the relevance of goals
and goal-directed behavior within decision-making. I outlined earlier their respec-
tive vital functions within a coherentist model and framework. Yet it is evident that
the model does not give any explanations about the origin of those goals. In the
following part I intend to frame this issue and point out some directions how this
flaw could be at least partially avoided.
The adoption of goals and anticipatory drive
Classic economic theory anticipates that people decide by maximizing expected util-
ity. The utility conception has been constructed in mathematical terms to reflect
people’s preferences grounded within their behavior of choice. The economic deci-
sion model appears appealing to the extend to predict how people decide given their
preferences, yet it fails to explain how people decide as it lacks an explanation where
those preferences arise from.
Up till today economists resisted the idea to explain preferences in terms of
mental processes that include utility as an emotional state or process despite the
numerous experiments that have been performed to show that traditional Expected
Utility theory often fails to account for human choice behavior (Thagard, 2010).
Within a more psychological and neurological appealing Thagartian coherentist
framework the role of propositions such as preferences, goals and actions play a vital
role. Thagard and Millgram (1997) describe a theory of decision where inferences
to the best plan are drawn based on underlying goals and actions which facilitate
(or not) those goals for the decision-maker in the most coherent way. The question
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however arises where those goals ultimately come from.
In fact we do not need to think on an everyday basis about our major goals that
we have in life where we base our decisions on but evidently now and then we are
facing major choices for example if we have to decide between two job offers or if we
have to take a decision regarding family planning. Those choices require not only
calculating the best means to established ends, but also figuring out what ends to
pursue (Thagard, 2010). Further, Thagard (2010) uses the notion “telic rationality”
to address normative questions about how we ought to go about adopting, aban-
doning and revaluing our goals.
Thagard highlights within this context that:
“We do not get autonomously to choose our goals, because some are
handed to us by our biological needs and others are transmitted socially,
through mechanisms such as attachment absent learning, role modeling
and altruism” (Thagard, 2010, p. 132).
In the following I explore the question concerning how people adopt goals on an
implicit sublevel of our conscious being down the lines of specific quantum mechan-
ical considerations. They build the theoretical starting point for modeling decision-
making within the coherentist framework alongside with parallel constraint satisfac-
tion principles and are thus in my understanding vital.
Ule (2012) claims in regard to the processual aspects of consciousness:
“The processual aspect of consciousness lies in the neural informational-
processes, in the flow of sensations and the change of feelings of a human
being who has become sensitive to processes around them (and them-
selves) and works on the basis of complex implicit and explicit anticipa-
tion models” (Ule, 2012, p. 38).
Rosen (1985) speaks of living beings as “anticipatory systems”. Additionally Ule
(2012) highlights that some living beings may have developed sensitivity towards
possible changes implied by sensed changes in that they somehow
“[...] connect actual and possible changes in other systems of states
with actual and possible changes in their own system of states. They
anticipate possible changes and react to them” (Ule, 2012, p. 26).
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Further, Butz et al. (2003) highlights “state anticipation” as a form of anticipa-
tion that entails:
“[...] an explicit predictive model of the environment which directs
decision-making. This kind of anticipation needs representations of goals,
mental simulations of actions and a plan for achieving the goal from the
given starting state.”
Later, Butz (2008) characterizes his notion of an “anticipatory drive” as follow-
ing:
“To realize anticipatory behavior, we propose that brain development
is predominantly controlled by an anticipatory drive, that is, a learn-
ing bias that enforces the formation of bidirectional, anticipatory brain
structures.The anticipatory drive is considered the dominant force in the
brain that causes the (modular) construction of predictive representa-
tions, which enable the activation of goal representations and eventually
the construction of our complex inner realities and our conscious selves”
(Butz, 2008).
In light of the above outlined process philosophical considerations I speculate
that “state anticipation” plays an implicit key role in directing decision-making
when considering maximizing coherence including constraint satisfaction principles
as this form of anticipation needs representations of goals, mental simulations of
actions and a plan for achieving the goal from the given starting state (Thagard,
2010, p. 27).
In this sense I believe there is an interesting structural similarity to constraint
satisfaction principles which I claim may indicate a significant anchor point in the un-
derstanding of the formation of propositions on which coherence maximizing mech-
anisms work upon within a coherentist decision-modeling framework.
I favor the constructivist view of Butz (2008) who argues that perceived reality is
based on the concept of a complex construct formed during stages of development.
According to Butz, brain structures built by the anticipatory drive are responsible
for determining explicit predictive models as well as for evolving “inner realities”.
This view is well expressed and conceptually similar to the concept of coherence
described in section 3 for mainly two reasons: First, the characteristic of bidirec-
tionality within anticipatory brain structures which are essentially enforced by an
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anticipatory drive which is in line with the key concept in modeling coherence max-
imizing decision-making networks within the brain and as such is crucial. Secondly,
characteristics of participatory drive appear to be functionally related to parallel
constraint satisfaction models of decision-making (Glo¨ckner and Betsch, 2008).
Within, the primary network of the model contains, likewise to Butz’s notion of
“anticipatory drive”, representations of constructed preferences like actions, goals
or other propositions on which consistency maximizing mechanisms act upon those
propositions considering all information of the network by changing the elements’
activation in order to deliver the result of the most coherent option for behavioral
decisions.
I see the fact that Butz (2008) further relates to a neuronal network model of
Tani (2008); Taylor (2008) that contest the connectionist description of anticipa-
tory drive as another insinuation towards the relevance and its ability of integration
within a connectionist parallel constraint satisfaction setting.
Thus, I stress the importance and potential of state anticipation as an element
within the model of a coherence-based behaving decision-maker. In this sense espe-
cially the mechanisms in building-up the proposition representation network within
an explicit predictive coherentist decision-making framework on which the coherent
decision-maker acts upon as outlined earlier in section 6.2 may indeed prove to be
fruitful. Further empirical investigations are needed to verify the claim.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
“There remains the final reflection, how shallow, puny and imperfect are efforts to
sound the depth in the nature of things. In philosophical discussions, the merest hint
of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly.”
Whitehead (1978, p. xiv)
To conclude, human decision-making cannot be represented as one gradual pro-
cess nor might it be accurate to describe the process as one mathematical calcu-
lation. Along the lines with a Thagardian notion of coherence I acknowledge that
there is substantive theoretical and empirical evidence that decision-making is rather
a dynamic interactive process utilizing mental parallel constraint satisfaction of in-
ferences based on specific propositions.
Practically speaking, in a situation where we have to decide between different
options, we – often intrinsically unconsciously – evaluate our mutually competing
aims and actions to facilitate our desired goals in a fashion that maximizes overall
coherence of all underlying propositions connected to the decision scenario and thus
makes the most sense to us.
It is important to recapitulate here that goals are emotionally valued mental
representations of imagined states of the world and self which the brain processes
by means of firing patterns in neural populations within and between specific func-
tional brain areas (Thagard, 2010, p. 140). Although within this work I did not
discuss and examine the extensive compelling evidence in the literature regarding
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the specific and critical role that emotions play when people decide, it should be
emphasized that emotional value is part of the underlying propositions within the
coherentist framework and are in addition represented within the weighting princi-
ples of interconnected relations among them (see section 3).
Decision-making modeled as parallel constraint satisfaction in order to maximize
coherence offers an elaborated way to describe how people draw conclusions based
on inferences on a vast amount of propositions. They are based on both, the inter-
action of unconscious and conscious processes as discussed in section 6.1.
As the parallel constraint satisfaction approach to model decision-making focuses
how people actually do decisions rather than how they are ought to decide, predic-
tions might turn out to be terrible wrong or misleading.
It is important to acknowledge one elemental critic on coherentism brought up by
foundationalism, namely, that the most coherent solution might not entail that it is
also true. I do think this objection is legitimate.
Yet up till today those ultimate truths could not have been identified that a foun-
dational position would demand in order to derive other truths from truths.
Therefore it holds that the most coherent option is not necessarily true itself, but it
appears likely to be. This is why we finally choose it.
The challenge remains to upscale parallel constraint satisfaction models within
a cognitive architecture of increased complexity like for example ACT-R (Anderson
et al., 2004) to test model behavior and its interoperability in order to “make sense”
in a broader perspective.
Because of the centrality of goals to the domain of decision-making, a major part
of this work has been devoted to philosophical considerations about how proposi-
tions such as goals arise and become “real” within a transition from implicitness to
explicitness (section 6.4) by elaborating on quantum mechanical conceptions.
Scientific interest emerges for Quantum Theory for various reasons while one key
aspect is supposedly the introduction of randomness through collapse-type quantum
effects. This in fact, so the hope, may provide a foundation in order to describe a
formalism as a common ground and starting point to understand mental events and
shed light on their interaction with neural correlates favored by a dualistic perspec-
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tive.
The elaborations between the connection of Whitehead’s process philosophy and
quantum mechanics let to the assumption that actual entities as described by White-
head have an objective as well as a subjective aspect. Interestingly, this actual entity
can – so the theory – be described as the indeterministic collapse of a wave function
in quantum theoretical terms.
Following Whitehead’s notion, an actual entity can be anything from the universe
to the “smallest pulse of experience”. My considerations conclude that essentially
within the process of decision-making it is possible to think of an “event” as an
actual entity within a human conscious stream of experience.
In consequence I believe that process philosophy provides an insightful starting point
for an understanding about the transition between “implicit” and “explicit” in that
we accept that mind-matter entanglement can be conceived as the hypothetical ori-
gin of mind-matter correlations (Atmanspacher, 2004).
The discussion about a notion of “potentiality” as conceived by Ule (2012) and
its role within decision-making called attention to the important interrelated con-
ception of “anticipation”. To that end I acknowledge that “anticipatory drive” plays
a key role in goal adoption and therefore various other cognitive and psychological
mechanisms. Consequently, I foresee that the coherentist framework and its appli-
cation within decision-making to some extend would benefit from the utilization of
anticipatory drive within. To give an example, an incorporation within the parallel
constraint satisfaction model as proposed by Glo¨ckner (2008), touching upon its goal
integration principles on “Network 1” may lead to an increase in predictive quality.
Nevertheless it should be also mentioned that there is the danger of jumping to
conclusions that Quantum Theory provides a solution for everything that cannot be
explained within our current understanding of classical Newtonian physics.
Accordingly, Ule (2012) addresses this concern as following:
“I could not find any clear cases of a structural analogy between these
quantum phenomena and quantum-mechanical laws, and the phenomena
and laws of human experiential consciousness. This fact along with the
fact that many lines of the structural analogy given above are incom-
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plete or are only postulated as some reasonable hypotheses show that
the structural analogy between quantum physical states/processes and
conscious states/processes is only partial and imperfect. In this sense,
I claim that human experiential consciousness indicates some important
quantum-like traits but not that it indicates some real quantum traits”
(Ule, 2012, p. 64).
This work constitutes an intentional strong interdisciplinary discourse on the
matter. I outlined examples how computer science implements models inspired
by neuroscience (neuronal networks) based on psychological evidence (inferential
reasoning, coherence shifts) enriched by philosophical considerations (process phi-
losophy, conception of potentiality and actuality). This should not be affirmed as
astonishing. Rather I see interdisciplinarity as inevitable for research and science in
order to succeed.
Within this work I could only provide a mere overview of the vast research field
on decision-making. Hopefully I succeeded to point out a few promising considera-
tions on how to push the endeavour forward.
It has to be admitted that a compelling all-in-one theory of how people do deci-
sions in a variety of circumstances across different environments and domains is not
in reach yet.
This is a task still to be solved in the future. Currently we need to be content with
explanations of limited scope. The floor remains wide open to explore further ways
to improve the prevailing state-of-the-art.
68
List of Figures
1.1 Similarity effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Attraction effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Compromise effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Decision Field Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1 Kanizsa Triangle illusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Rabbit-duck illusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 General structure of a PCS network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.4 Sigmoid-shaped function graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.1 PCS rule within a PCS network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.2 Primary-secondary network interactions within the PCS model . . . 46
69

Bibliography
Abelson, R. P. (1968). Psychological implication. In Abelson, R. P., Aronson, E.,
McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. M., Rosenberg, M. J., and Tannenbaum, R. H.,
editors, Theories of Cognitive Consistency A Sourcebook, Theories of cognitive
consistency: A sourcebook, pages 112–139. Rand McNally.
Agrawal, P. M. and Sharda, R. (2010). Quantum Mechanics and Human Decision
Making. SSRN eLibrary.
Amini, M. (2003). Has Foundationalism Failed? A critical review of Coherence
in Thought and Action By Paul Thagard. Human Nature Review 2003, volume
3:119–123.
Anderson, J. R., Bothell, D., Byrne, M. D., Douglass, S., Lebiere, C., and Qin, Y.
(2004). An integrated theory of the mind. Psychological review, 111(4):1036–60.
Ariely, D. (2008). Are we in control of our own decisions? TED: EG The Entertain-
ment Gathering Conference. Monterey, California.
Atmanspacher, H. (2004). Quantum theory and consciousness: an overview with
selected examples. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2004(1):51–73.
Atmanspacher, H. (2006). Already Whitehead, James, and Quantum Theory. White-
heads Process Ontology as a Framework for a Heisenberg/James/von Neumann
Conception of Nature and of Human Nature.
Augier, M. and Feigenbaum, E. (2003). Herbert A. Simon: 15 June 1916 - 9 February
2001. Proceedings Of The American Philosophical Society, 147(2):193–198.
Beach, L. R. and Mitchell, T. R. (1978). A Contingency Model for the Selection of
Decision Strategies. Academy of Management Review, 3(3):439–449.
71
Bibliography 72
Betsch, T. (2005). Preference Theory: An Affect-Based Approach to Recurrent
Decision Making. In Betsch, T. and Haberstroh, S., editors, The Routines of
decision making:, volume 39, pages 39–66. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
Betsch, T. and Glo¨ckner, A. (2010). Accounting for Critical Evidence While Being
Precise and Avoiding the Strategy Selection Problem in a Parallel Constraint
Satisfaction Approach: A Reply to Marewski. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 472:468–472.
Betsch, T., Haberstroh, S., and Hohle, C. (2002). Explaining routinized decision
making: A review of theories and models. Theory & Psychology, 12(4):453.
BonJour, L. (1999). The dialectic of foundationalism and coherentism. The Blackwell
Guide to Epistemology, pages 117–127.
Busemeyer, J. R., Barkan, R., Mehta, S., and Chaturvedi, A. (2007). Context effects
and models of preferential choice: Implications for consumer behavior. Marketing
Theory, 7(1):39–58.
Busemeyer, J. R. and Johnson, J. G. (2003). Computational models of decision
making. Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making, 1:1–48.
Busemeyer, J. R. and Johnson, J. G. (2008). Micro-process models of decision
making. Cambridge handbook of computational psychology, Cambridge:302–321.
Busemeyer, J. R., Wang, Z., and Townsend, J. T. (2006). Quantum dynamics of
human decision-making. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 50(3):220–241.
Butz, M. V. (2008). How and why the brain lays the foundations for a conscious
self. Constructivist Foundations, 4(1):1–42.
Butz, M. V., Sigaud, O., and Gerard, P. (2003). Internal Models and Anticipations
in Adaptive Learning Systems. Learning, 2684:86–109.
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory,
volume 52. Oxford University Press.
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error. Putnam New York.
Dijksterhuis, A. and Nordgren, L. F. (2006). A theory of unconscious thought.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1(2):95.
72
73 Bibliography
Dijksterhuis Loran F, A. N. (2006). A theory of unconscious thought (UTT). Per-
spectives on Psychological Science, 1(2):14.
Dougherty, M. R. P., Gettys, C. F., and Ogden, E. E. (1999). MINERVA-DM:
A memory processes model for judgments of likelihood. Psychological Review,
106(1):180–209.
Doyle, R. (2009). Free will: it’s a normal biological property, not a gift or a mystery.
Nature, 459(7250):1052.
Evans, J. S. (2003). In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 7(10):454–459.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance, volume 207. Stanford Uni-
versity Press.
Fiedler, K. (2000). Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to
judgment biases. Psychological Review, 107(4):659–676.
Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., and Johnson, S. M. (2000). The af-
fect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 13(1):1–17.
Fishburn, P. C. (1974). Lexicographic orders, utilities and decision rules: A survey.
Management Science, 20(11):1442–1471.
Frederick, S. (2002). Automated Choice Heuristics. In Gilovich, T., Griffin, D.,
and Kahneman, D., editors, Heuristics and Biases. The Psychology of Intuitive
Judgment, chapter 30. Cambridge University Press.
French, A. P. and Taylor, E. F. (1979). An Introduction to Quantum Physics. Stanley
Thornes.
Fuchs, T. (2005). Was heisst ’sich entscheiden’? Zur Debatte um die Willensfreiheit.
Scheidewege, 35.
Fum, D., Missier, F., and Stocco, A. (2007). The cognitive modeling of human be-
havior: Why a model is (sometimes) better than 10,000 words. Cognitive Systems
Research, 8(3):135–142.
Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Fast and frugal heuristics: The tools of bounded rationality.
Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making, pages 62–88.
73
Bibliography 74
Gigerenzer, G. and Brighton, H. (2009). Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds
Make Better Inferences. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(1):107–143.
Gigerenzer, G. and Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal way:
models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103(4):650–669.
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., and Group ABC Research (1999). Simple Heuristics
That Make Us Smart. Oxford University Press, New York.
Gilovich, T., Griffin, D. W., and Kahneman, D. (2002). Heuristics and biases.
Cambridge University Press.
Glo¨ckner, A. (2006). Automatische Prozesse bei Entscheidungen. Kovac, Hamburg.
Glo¨ckner, A. (2008). How evolution outwits bounded rationality: The efficient inter-
action of automatic and deliberate processes in decision making and implications
for institutions. Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective GoodsBonn.
Glo¨ckner, A. and Betsch, T. (2008). Modeling Option and Strategy Choices with
Connectionist Networks: Towards an Integrative Model of Automatic and Delib-
erate Decision Making. SSRN eLibrary.
Glo¨ckner, A., Betsch, T., and Schindler, N. (2010). Coherence Shifts in Probabilistic
Inference Tasks. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, pages 439–462.
Glo¨ckner, A. and Witteman, C. (2010). Beyond dual-process models: A categorisa-
tion of processes underlying intuitive judgement and decision making. Thinking
& Reasoning, 16(1):1–25.
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist
approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4):814–834.
Hastie, R. (2001). Problems for judgment and decision making. Annual Review of
Psychology, 52:653–683.
Heider, F. (1946). Attitudes and cognitive organization. The Journal of psychology,
21(1):107–112.
Heider, F. (1960). The gestalt theory of motivation. In Jones, M. R., editor, Nebraska
symposium on motivation, volume 8, pages 145–172. University of Nebraska Press,
Lincoln.
74
75 Bibliography
Heider, F. (1979). On Balance and Attribution. In Holland, P. W. and Leinhardt, S.,
editors, Perspectives on Social Network Research, Perspectives on Social Networks,
pages 11–23. Academic Press.
Heisenberg, W. (1976). Physics and Philosophy. Science, 19(5):224.
Hoffrage, U. and Hertwig, R. (1999). Hindsight bias: A price worth paying for fast
and frugal memory. Simple heuristics that make us smart. In Gigerenzer, G.,
Todd, P. M., and ABC Research Group, editors, Simple heuristics that make us
smart., pages 191–208. Oxford University Press, New York.
Hogarth, R. M. (2001). Educating intuition. Applied Cognitive Psychology,
17(1):312.
Holyoak, K. J. and Simon, D. (1999). Bidirectional reasoning in decision making by
constraint satisfaction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128(1):3–
31.
Hopfield, J. J. (1982). Neural networks and physical systems with emergent collective
computational abilities. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America, 79(8):2554–2558.
Kahneman, D. and Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute
substitution in intuitive judgment. In Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., and Kahneman,
D., editors, System, number 1, chapter 2, pages 49–81. Cambridge University
Press.
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory. Econometrica, 47(2):311.
Kanizsa, G. (1955). Margini quasi-percettivi in campi con stimolazione omogenea.
Rivista di Psicologia, 49(1):7–30.
Keren, G. and Schul, Y. (2009). Two is not always better than one. A Critical
Evaluation of Two-System Theories. A critical evaluation of twosystem theories,
4(6):533–550.
Klein, G. (1999). Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, volume 52. MIT
Press.
Klose, J. (2009). Process ontology from Whitehead to quantum physics. In At-
manspacher, H. and Primas, H., editors, Recasting Reality, number May, pages
151–170. Springer.
75
Bibliography 76
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions, volume 2nd. University
of Chicago Press.
Lewin, K. (1935). A dynamic theory of personality, volume 2008. McGraw-Hill.
Lieberman, M. D. (2000). Intuition: a social cognitive neuroscience approach. Psy-
chological Bulletin, 126(1):109–137.
Litt, A., Eliasmith, C., Kroon, F. W., Weinstein, S., and Thagard, P. (2006). Is the
brain a quantum computer? Cognitive Science, 30(3):593–603.
Marewski, J. N. (2010). On the Theoretical Precision and Strategy Selection Problem
of a Single-Strategy Approach : A Comment on Glo and Schindler ( 2010 ).
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 467:463–467.
Marewski, J. N., Gaissmaier, W., and Gigerenzer, G. (2009). We favor formal models
of heuristics rather than lists of loose dichotomies: a reply to Evans and Over.
Cognitive Processing, 11(2):177–179.
McClelland, J. L. and Rumelhart, D. E. (1986). Parallel Distributed Processing: Ex-
plorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, volume 1 of Computational Models
of Cognition and Perception. MIT Press.
McGuire, W. J. (1960). Cognitive consistency and attitude change. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60(3):345–353.
Moyal-Sharrock, D. and Brenner, W. H. (2005). Readings of Wittgenstein’s On
Certainty. Philosophical Investigations, pages 1–349.
Myrvold, W. C., Christian, J., and Malin, S. (2009). Whitehead’s Philosophy and
Quantum Mechanics (QM). In Demopoulos, W., Devidi, D., Disalle, R., and
Myrvold, W., editors, Quantum Reality, Relativistic Causality, and Closing the
Epistemic Circle, volume 73 of The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of
Science, pages 63–68. Springer Netherlands.
Nordgren, L. F., Bos, M. W., and Dijksterhuis, A. (2011). The best of both worlds:
Integrating conscious and unconscious thought best solves complex decisions.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(2):509–511.
Osman, M. (2004). An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning. Psychonomic
bulletin & review, 11(6):988–1010.
76
77 Bibliography
Payne, J. W. (1982). Contingent Decision Behavior. Psychological Bulletin,
92(2):382–402.
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., and Johnson, E. J. (1988). Adaptive strategy selection
in decision making. Journal Of Experimental Psychology. Learning Memory And
Cognition, 14(3):534–552.
Pepitone, A. (1966). Some conceptual and empirical problems of consistency mod-
els. In Feldman, S., editor, Cognitive consistency: Motivational antecedents and
behavior consequents, pages 257–297. Academic Press, New York.
Plessner, H., Betsch, C., and Betsch, T. (2007). Intuition in Judgment and Decision
Making. Lawrence Erlbaum, 1 edition.
Plous, S. (1993). The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making. The Journal
of Politics, 68(01):302.
Polasek, W. (2000). The Bernoullis and the origin of probability theory: Looking
back after 300 years. Resonance, 5(8):26–42.
Pothos, E. M. and Busemeyer, J. R. (2009). A quantum probability explanation
for violations of ‘rational’ decision theory. Proceedings of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences, 276(1665):2171–2178.
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, truth, and history. Cambridge Univ Press.
Read, S. J. and Miller, L. C. (1994). Dissonance and balance in belief systems: The
promise of parallel constraint satisfaction processes and connectionist modeling
approaches. Beliefs, reasoning, and decision making: Psycho-logic in honor of
Bob Abelson, pages 209–235.
Read, S. J., Snow, C. J., and Simon, D. (2003). Constraint satisfaction processes in
social reasoning. In Annual meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Boston.
Read, S. J., Vanman, E. J., and Miller, L. C. (1997). Connectionism, parallel
constraint satisfaction processes, and gestalt principles: (Re)Introducing cognitive
dynamics to social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1(1):26.
Rosen, R. (1985). Anticipatory Systems. Pergamon Press, New York.
77
Bibliography 78
Rosenberg, M. J. and Abelson, R. P. (1960). An analysis of cognitive balancing.
In Attitude organization and change. An analysis of consistency among attitude
components, volume 3, pages 112–163. Yale University Press.
Roth, G. (2001). Fu¨hlen, Denken, Handeln: wie das Gehirn unser Verhalten steuert.
Suhrkamp.
Schopenhauer, A. (1973). Essays and Aphorisms (Parerga and Paralipomena). Pen-
guin Books, London.
Schwartz, B. (2005). The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less. Harper Perennial.
Simon, D. (2004). A Third View of the Black Box : Cognitive Coherence in Legal
Decision Making. In Memory & Cognition, pages 511–586.
Simon, D. and Holyoak, K. J. (2002). Structural dynamics of cognition: From
consistency theories to constraint satisfaction. Personality and social psychology
review, 6(4):283.
Simon, D., Krawczyk, D. C., and Holyoak, K. J. (2004a). Construction of preferences
by constraint satisfaction. Psychological Science, 15(5):331–336.
Simon, D., Pham, L. B., Le, Q. A., and Holyoak, K. J. (2001). The Emergence of
Coherence Over the Course of Decision Making. Learning, Memory, 27(5):1250–
1260.
Simon, D., Snow, C. J., and Read, S. J. (2004b). The redux of cognitive consistency
theories: evidence judgments by constraint satisfaction. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 86(6):814–837.
Simon, H. A. (1955). A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 69(1):99–118.
Simon, H. A. (1982). Models of bounded rationality, volume 2. MIT Press.
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological
bulletin, 119(1):3–22.
Spaemann, R. (1996). Personen: Versuche ueber den Unterschied zwischen ’etwas’
und ’jemand’. Klett-Cotta.
78
79 Bibliography
Spellman, B. A., Ullman, J. B., and Holyoak, K. J. (1993). A coherence model of
cognitive consistency: Dynamics of attitude change during the Persian Gulf War.
Journal of Social Issues, 49(4):147–165.
Stanovich, K. E. and West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: impli-
cations for the rationality debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23(5):645–665.
Tani, J. (2008). Objectifying the subjective self. An account from a synthetic robotic
approach. Constructivist Foundations, 4(1):28–30.
Tannenbaum, P. (1968). Summary: Is anything special about consistency? In
Abelson, R. P., Aronson, E., McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. M., Rosenberg, M. J.,
and Tannenbaum, P. M., editors, Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook,
pages 343–346. Rand McNally, Chicago.
Taylor, J. G. (2008). Anticipation of motor acts. Good for sportsmen, bad for
thinkers. Constructivist Foundations, 4(1):30–31.
Thagard, P. (1989). Explanatory coherence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
12(3):435–502.
Thagard, P. (1992). Conceptual revolutions. Princeton University Press.
Thagard, P. (2000). Coherence in Thought and Action. MIT Press.
Thagard, P. (2008). Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cog-
nition. Mit Pr.
Thagard, P. (2010). The brain and the meaning of life. Young.
Thagard, P. and Kroon, F. W. (2006). Emotional consensus in group decision
making. Mind & Society, 5(1):85–104.
Thagard, P. and Millgram, E. (1995). Inference to the best plan: A coherence theory
of decision.
Thagard, P. and Millgram, E. (1997). Inference to the Best Plan : A Coherence
Theory of Decision. Learning.
Thagard, P. and Stewart, T. C. (2010). The AHA! experience: creativity through
emergent binding in neural networks. Cognitive science, 35(1):1–33.
79
Bibliography 80
Thomae, H. (1960). Der Mensch in der Entscheidung. Johann Ambrosius Barth,
Mu¨nchen.
Thomas, M. S. C. and McLelland, J. L. (2008). Connectionist models of cognition.
In Sun, R., editor, Psychology, pages 1–84. Cambridge University Press.
Tversky, A. (1972). Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice. Preference, Belief,
and Similarity: Selected Writings, page 463.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases. Science, 185(4157):1124–31.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative
representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4):297–323.
Ule, A. (2009). Collective Decision Making as the Actualization of Decision Poten-
tial. Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 7(2):90–105.
Ule, A. (2012). Mind in Physical Reality, its Potentiality and Actuality. In Markicˇ,
O., Ursˇicˇ, M., and Ule, A., editors, Mind in Nature: From Science to Philosophy,
chapter III. Nova Science Pub Inc.
Van Der Rijt, J.-W. (2006). The ruin of Homo Oeconomicus. Homo, pages 1–9.
Von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior, volume 2. Princeton University Press.
Walther, E. (2002). Guilty by mere association: evaluative conditioning and the
spreading attitude effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(6):919–
934.
Wertheimer, M. (1924). U¨ber Gestalttheorie. In Die Logik der Lebensferne, volume 7.
Whitehead, A. N. (1978). Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. The Free
Press, New York.
Zajonc, R. B. (1983). Discussion of Abelsons talk on Cartwrights founders day.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 9:55–59.
80
Appendix
Abstract
Human decision-making behavior is subject of much ongoing debate within the sci-
entific community. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and shed light upon
the phenomenon towards a better understanding of the matter. In fact this endeavor
directs much attention to the concept of coherence with specific focus on its role and
interplay in the subject.
Rational Choice Theory and its modifications have dominated the field of decision-
making research for decades. These theories understand humans as explicit rational
beings. There is reasonable doubt that individuals are able to perform the complex
calculations necessary in this regard (Simon, 1955).
Upon these considerations, the work reviews distinct models and theories that
emerged within the field of decision research. It depicts the relevance of a Tha-
gardian notion of the concept of coherence with its underlying parallel constraint
satisfaction (PCS) mechanisms (Thagard and Millgram, 1997). This approach to de-
scribe decision-making behavior is based on the idea that people try to make sense
of the world on the basis of fitting something puzzling into a coherent pattern of
mental representations.
The centerpiece of this thesis outlines and discusses how the PCS rule fits into an
explanation of decision-making behavior. The methodology aims to find the most
coherent solution to the decision problem as a single-strategy approach.
The hypothesis suggests that decision-making can be described as the interaction of
automatic- and deliberate parallel processes that strive to maximize overall coher-
ence. Unconscious moments represent a vital aspect within the assumption. They
appear to be key for a better and encompassing understanding oft the phenomenon.
The thesis frames empirical evidence that coherence shifts appear when individuals
are confronted with decision tasks (Holyoak and Simon, 1999). This implies far
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reaching consequences regarding basic mechanisms that are in place while people
arrive at decision outcomes.
The validity of the hypothesis is critically investigated along the lines of its psycho-
logical plausibility. Further, philosophical considerations and quantum-theoretical
thoughts in connection with the role of potentiality and actuality within the decision-
making process are taken into account.
The thesis concludes by arguing in favor of a coherence maximizing single-strategy
approach to decision-making within complex circumstances and highlights remain-
ing challenges yet to be solved in the future.
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83 Kurzfassung
Kurzfassung
Ziel dieser Diplomarbeit ist eine interdisziplina¨re Betrachtungsweise des Pha¨nomens
der Entscheidungsfindung. Spezielles Augenmerk dabei wird auf die Rolle des Be-
griffs der Koha¨renz gelegt. In diesem Kontext werden diverse Modelle zur Entschei-
dungsfindung ero¨rtert, und verschiedene Arten kognitiver Denkprozesse hervorge-
hoben.
Ausgangspunkt der Arbeit bildet der begru¨ndete Verdacht, dass Menschen in ihren
Handlungen nicht mit jener Auspra¨gung rational handeln, wie lange Zeit angenom-
men (Simon, 1955). Weiters wird auf das Gebiet der Gestalttheorie verwiesen, aus
welchem das Prinzip der “parallel constraint satisfaction” Prozesse herausgearbeitet
wird. Die spezielle Bedeutung einer Konzeption der Koha¨renz nach Thagard in
diesem Zusammenhang bildet die Kernthematik der Arbeit (Thagard and Millgram,
1997).
Als zentraler Bestandteil wird die These vertreten, dass Entscheidungsprozesse als
Resultat paralleler Abla¨ufe beschrieben werden ko¨nnen. Diese haben zum Ziel, durch
die Interaktion von automatischen und deliberativen Denkprozessen eine Koha¨renz-
maximierung der mental representierten Entscheidungssituation herbeizufu¨hren.
Weiters wird argumentiert, dass unbewusste Momente von zentraler Bedeutung im
Fa¨llen komplexer Entscheidungen sind.
Es werden Beweise und Hinweise aus der Literatur ausgefu¨hrt, welche die eingangs
erwa¨hnte Hypothese untermauern (Holyoak and Simon, 1999). Diese wird hinge-
hend ihrer Relevanz evaluiert. Anschliessend sind die Befunde Gegenstand einer
kritischen Diskussion. Dabei wird die Hypothese auf ihre Haltbarkeit hin u¨berpru¨ft.
Den Abschluss bildet eine philosophische Betrachtung der Rolle des “Impliziten”
beziehungsweise “Expliziten” im Entscheidungsfindungsprozess. Hierbei wird von
der Prozessphilosophie ausgehend auf den Begriff der Potenzialita¨t und Aktualita¨t
eingegangen. Es werden etwaige Analogien in Hinblick auf den Koha¨renzbegriff
unter quantentheoretischen U¨berlegungen herausgearbeitet.
Es wird der Schluss nahegelegt, dass menschlichen Entscheidungsprozessen speziell
in komplexen Situationen der zentrale Mechanismus der Koha¨renzmaximierung zu-
grunde liegt. Dieser kann grundsa¨tzlich als dynamisch interaktiver Prozess zwischen
bewussten, beziehungsweise unbewussten Momenten auf Basis von Inferenzen ver-
standen werden.
Es wird weiters gezeigt, dass Potenzialita¨t einen wesentlichen Beitrag fu¨r ein
verbessertes Versta¨ndnis von Entscheidungsprozessen leistet. Quantentheoretische
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U¨berlegungen liefern dabei Denkansto¨sse fu¨r ein besseres Versta¨ndnis von Entste-
hung und Natur von Entscheidungsprozessen.
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